Arman vs State of U.P. Thru. Prin. Secy. Home Lko. and 3 Others

Heard Smt. Nalini Prakash Jain, learned counsel for the applicant, Shri S.K. Tiwari, learned A.G.A. for the State as well as Shri Shri Srees Kumar Srivastava along with Ms Tiwari Shivani Subhash, learned counsel for the complainant/opposite party No.2 and perused the record.

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The present application has been filed on behalf of the applicant seeking bail in FIR/Case Crime No.0058/2024, under Sections 363, 366, 376 I.P.C. Section 3/4 of the POCSO Act, Police Station - Safipur, District - Unnao.

¶14

Considered the submissions as indicated by the learned counsel for the parties based upon the material available on record including that,

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(i) The applicant, who is innocent and having no criminal history and is in jail since 17.03.2024, with the help of other co-accused named in the F.I.R. namely Salman, Fatima and John Mohammad enticed away the minor daughter of the informant/complainant aged about 16 years;

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(ii) On being recovered the statement of the victim was recorded by the Investigating Officer (in short "I.O.") in terms of Section 161 Cr.P.C., according to which the victim aged about 17 years on her own volition left the house of her parents and made a call to the applicant who was known to the victim for a period of about 06 months and this statement further indicates that the victim was inclined to solemnize marriage with the applicant;

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(iii) According to the statement of the victim under Section 183 B.N.S.S, on the date of alleged incident she was about 16 years and 08 months i.e. about 17 years and victim and the applicant were known to each other and on her own volition established physical relations with the applicant and wanted to solemnize marriage with the applicant;

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(iv) Before the trial court the victim stated that it is the applicant who enticed away the victim.

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This Court also considered the fact as indicated by the learned counsel for the opposite party No.2 that the trial is at the stage of defence evidence as statement of the accused under Section 313 Cr.P.C. has already been recorded.

¶22

This Court also took note of the fact that the applicant having no criminal history is in jail since 17.03.2024. Thus, the period of incarceration is about 21 months.

¶23

This Court also took note of the submission that taking note of the period of incarceration w.e.f. 17.03.2024 the applicant is entitled to be released on bail.

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This Court also took note of the observations made by the Hon'ble Apex Court in the in the following judgment(s) :-

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(1) In Gudikanti Narasimhulu v. High Court of A.P. (1978) 1 SCC 240 : 1978 SCC (Cri) 115 as upheld in a subsequent decision in Babu Singh v. State of U.P.(1978) 1 SCC 579 : 1978 SCC (Cri) 133 the Hon'ble Apex Court observed as under :-

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‘ 1. “Bail or jail”— at the pre-trial or post-conviction stage belongs to the blurred area of the criminal justice system and largely hinges on the hunch of the Bench, otherwise called judicial discretion. The Code is cryptic on this topic and the court prefers to be tacit, be the order custodial or not. And yet, the issue is one of liberty, justice, public safety and burden of the public treasury, all of which insist that a developed jurisprudence of bail is integral to a socially sensitised judicial process. As Chamber Judge in this summit court I have to deal with this uncanalised case flow, ad hoc response to the docket being the flickering candle light. So it is desirable that the subject is disposed of on basic principle, not improvised brevity draped as discretion. Personal liberty, deprived when bail is refused, is too precious a value of our constitutional system recognised under Article 21 that the curial power to negate it is a great trust exercisable, not casually but judicially, with lively concern for the cost to the individual and the community. To glamorize impressionistic orders as discretionary may, on occasions, make a litigative gamble decisive of a fundamental right. After all, personal liberty of an accused or convict is fundamental, suffering lawful eclipse only in terms of “procedure established by law.”

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(2) In Hussainara Khatoon (I) v. State of Bihar (1980) 1 SCC 81: 1980 SCC (Cri) 23 the Supreme Court held as under: (SCC p. 89, para 5)

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“ 5. … Now obviously procedure prescribed by law for depriving a person of liberty cannot be ‘reasonable, fair or just’ unless that procedure ensures a speedy trial for determination of the guilt of such person. No procedure which does not ensure a reasonably quick trial can be regarded as ‘reasonable, fair or just’ and it would fall foul of Article 21. There can, therefore, be no doubt that speedy trial and by speedy trial we mean reasonably expeditious trial, is an integral and essential part of the fundamental right to life and liberty enshrined in Article 21. The question which would, however, arise is as to what would be the consequence if a person accused of an offence is denied speedy trial and is sought to be deprived of his liberty by imprisonment as a result of a long delayed trial in violation of his fundamental right under Article 21.”

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(3) In Abdul Rehman Antulay v. R.S. Nayak(1992) 1 SCC 225 : 1992 SCC (Cri) 93 the Supreme Court held as under: (SCC pp. 270-273, para 86)

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“ 65. … Even apart from Article 21 courts in this country have been cognizant of undue delays in criminal matters and wherever there was inordinate delay or where the proceedings were pending for too long and any further proceedings were deemed to be oppressive and unwarranted, they were put an end to by making appropriate orders.” (SCC p. 260, para 65)

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“ 83. But then speedy trial or other expressions conveying the said concept are necessarily relative in nature.One may ask speedy means, how speedy? How long a delay is too long? We do not think it is possible to lay down any time schedules for conclusion of criminal proceedings. The nature of offence, the number of accused, the number of witnesses, the workload in the particular court, means of communication and several other circumstances have to be kept in mind.… it is neither advisable nor feasible to draw or prescribe an outer time-limit for conclusion of all criminal proceedings. It is not necessary to do so for effectuating the right to speedy trial. We are also not satisfied that without such an outer limit, the right becomes illusory.”

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“ 86. In view of the above discussion, the following propositions emerge, meant to serve as guidelines. We must forewarn that these propositions are not exhaustive. It is difficult to foresee all situations. Nor is it possible to lay down any hard and fast rules. These propositions are:

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(1) Fair, just and reasonable procedure implicit in Article 21of the Constitutioncreates a right in the accused to be tried speedily. Right to speedy trial is the right of the accused. The fact that a speedy trial is also in public interest or that it serves the societal interest also, does not make it any the less the right of the accused. It is in the interest of all concerned that the guilt or innocence of the accused is determined as quickly as possible in the circumstances.

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(2) Right to speedy trial flowing from Article 21 encompasses all the stages, namely, the stage of investigation, inquiry, trial, appeal, revision and retrial. That is how, this Court has understood this right and there is no reason to take a restricted view.

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(3) The concerns underlying the right to speedy trial from the point of view of the accused are:

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( a ) the period of remand and pre-conviction detention should be as short as possible. In other words, the accused should not be subjected to unnecessary or unduly long incarceration prior to his conviction;

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( b ) the worry, anxiety, expense and disturbance to his vocation and peace, resulting from an unduly prolonged investigation, inquiry or trial should be minimal; and

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( c ) undue delay may well result in impairment of the ability of the accused to defend himself, whether on account of death, disappearance or non-availability of witnesses or otherwise.

(4)-(11) ”

(emphasis supplied)

**********

21. Is it at all necessary to have limitation bars terminating trials and proceedings? Is there no effective mechanism available for achieving the same end? The Criminal Procedure Code, as it stands, incorporates a few provisions to which resort can be had for protecting the interest of the accused and saving him from unreasonable prolixity or laxity at the trial amounting to oppression. Section 309, dealing with power to postpone or adjourn proceedings, provides generally for every inquiry or trial, being proceeded with as expeditiously as possible and in particular, when the examination of witnesses has once begun, the same to be continued from day-to-day until all the witnesses in attendance have been examined, unless the court finds the adjournment of the same beyond the following day to be necessary for reasons to be recorded. Explanation 2 to Section 309 confers power on the court to impose costs to be paid by the prosecution or the accused, in appropriate cases and putting the parties on terms while granting an adjournment or postponing of proceedings. This power to impose costs is rarely exercised by the courts.… In appropriate cases, inherent power of the High Court, under Section 482 can be invoked to make such orders, as may be necessary, to give effect to any order under the Criminal Procedure Code or to prevent abuse of the process of any court, or otherwise, to secure the ends of justice. The power is wide and, if judiciously and consciously exercised, can take care of almost all the situations where interference by the High Court becomes necessary on account of delay in proceedings or for any other reason amounting to oppression or harassment in any trial, inquiry or proceedings. In appropriate cases, the High Courts have exercised their jurisdiction under Section 482 CrPC for quashing of first information report and investigation and terminating criminal proceedings if the case of abuse of process of law was clearly made out. Such power can certainly be exercised on a case being made out of breach of fundamental right conferred by Article 21 of the Constitution. The Constitution Bench in Abdul Rehman Antulay v. R.S. Nayak referred to such power, vesting in the High Court (vide paras 62 and 65 of its judgment) and held that it was clear that even apart from Article 21, the courts can take care of undue or inordinate delays in criminal matters or proceedings if they remain pending for too long and putting an end, by making appropriate orders, to further proceedings when they are found to be oppressive and unwarranted.

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(4). In Supreme Court Legal Aid Committee (Representing Undertrial Prisioners) v. Union of India(1995) 4 SCC 695 : 1995 SCC (Cri) 822, the Supreme Court has held that: (SCC p. 750, para 17)

¶49

“ 17. We are conscious of the fact that the menace of drug trafficking has to be controlled by providing stringent punishments and those who indulge in such nefarious activities do not deserve any sympathy. But at the same time we cannot be oblivious to the fact that many innocent persons may also be languishing in jails if we recall to mind the percentage of acquittals. Since harsh punishments have been

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provided for under the Act, the percentage of disposals on plea of guilt is bound to be small; the State Government should, therefore, have realised the need for setting up sufficient number of Special Courts immediately after the amendment of the Act by Amendment Act 2 of 1989. Even after the Division Bench of the Bombay High Court refused to grant en bloc enlargement on bail on 1-2-1993 in Criminal Application No. 3480 of 1992 and B.D. Criminal No. 565 of 1992, no substantial improvement in the pendency is shown since new cases continue to pour in and, therefore, a one-time exercise has become imperative to place the system on an even keel. We also recommend to the State Government to set up Review Committees headed by a judicial officer, preferably a retired High Court Judge, with one or two other members to review the cases of undertrials who have been in jail for long including those released under this order and to recommend to the State Government which of the cases deserve withdrawal. The State Government can then advise the Public Prosecutor to move the court for withdrawal of such cases. This will not only help reduce the pendency but will also increase the credibility of the prosecuting agency. After giving effect to this order the Special Court may consider giving priority to cases of those undertrials who continue in jail despite this order on account of their inability to furnish bail.”

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(5). The Supreme Court in Union of India v. K.A. Najeeb(2021) 3 SCC 713 while commenting upon the possibility of early completion of trial and extended incarceration held as under:

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“ 18. Adverting to the case at hand, we are conscious of the fact that the charges levelled against the respondent are grave and a serious threat to societal harmony. Had it been a case at the threshold, we would have outrightly turned down the respondent's prayer. However, keeping in mind the length of the period spent by him in custody and the unlikelihood of the trial being completed anytime soon, the High Court appears to have been left with no other option except to grant bail. An attempt has been made to strike a balance between the appellant's right to lead evidence of its choice and establish the charges beyond any doubt and simultaneously the respondent's rights guaranteed under Part III of our Constitution have been well protected.”

¶55

(6). In Satender Kumar Antil v. CBI(2022) 10 SCC 51 :(2023) 1 SCC (Cri) 1 , in paras 6 to 15 the Supreme Court considered the prevailing situation of prisons in India, definition of trial and bail, principle of presumption of innocence and reiterated the well recognised principle that bail is the rule and jail is the exception in bail jurisprudence on the touchstone of Article 21of the Constitution of India . Paras 6 to 15 of the said judgment read as under: (SCC pp. 75-79, paras 6-15)

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“ Prevailing situation

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6. Jails in India are flooded with undertrial prisoners. The statistics placed before us would indicate that more than 2/3rd of the inmates of the prisons constitute undertrial prisoners. Of this category of prisoners, majority may not even be required to be arrested despite registration of a cognizable offence, being charged with offences punishable for seven years or less. They are not only poor and illiterate but also would include women. Thus, there is a culture of offence being inherited by many of them. As observed by this Court, it certainly exhibits the mindset, a vestige of colonial India, on the part of the investigating agency, notwithstanding the fact arrest is a draconian measure resulting in curtailment of liberty and thus to be used sparingly. In a democracy, there can never be an impression that it is a police State as both are conceptually opposite to each other.

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Definition of trial

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7. The word ‘trial’ is not explained and defined under the Code. An extended meaning

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has to be given to this word for the purpose of enlargement on bail to include, the stage of investigation and thereafter. Primary considerations would obviously be different between these two stages. In the former stage, an arrest followed by a police custody may be warranted for a thorough investigation, while in the latter what matters substantially is the proceedings before the court in the form of a trial. If we keep the above distinction in mind, the consequence to be drawn is for a more favourable consideration towards enlargement when investigation is completed, of course, among other factors.

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8. Similarly, an appeal or revision shall also be construed as a facet of trial when it comes to the consideration of bail on suspension of sentence.

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Definition of bail

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9. The term ‘bail’ has not been defined in the Code, though is used very often. A bail is nothing but a surety inclusive of a personal bond from the accused. It means the release of an accused person either by the orders of the court or by the police or by the investigating agency.

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10. It is a set of pre-trial restrictions imposed on a suspect while enabling any interference in the judicial process. Thus, it is a conditional release on the solemn undertaking by the suspect that he would cooperate both with the investigation and the trial. The word ‘bail’ has been defined in Black's Law Dictionary, 9th Edn., p. 160 as:

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‘ A security such as cash or a bond; especially, security required by a court for the release of a prisoner who must appear in court at a future time.’

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11.Wharton's Law Lexicon, 14th Edn., p. 105 defines ‘bail’ as:

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‘ to set at liberty a person arrested or imprisoned, on security being taken for his appearance on a day and at a place certain, which security is called bail, because the party arrested or imprisoned is delivered into the hands of those who bind themselves or become bail for his due appearance when required, in order that he may be safely protected from prison, to which they have, if they fear his escape, etc. the legal power to deliver him.’

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Bail is the rule

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12. The principle that bail is the rule and jail is the exception has been well recognised through the repetitive pronouncements of this Court. This again is on the touchstone of Article 21of the Constitution of India. This Court in Nikesh Tarachand Shah v. Union of India(2018) 11 SCC 1: (2018) 2 SCC (Cri) 302, held that: (SCC pp. 22-23 and 27, paras 19 and 24)

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‘ 19. In Gurbaksh Singh Sibbia v. State of Punjab (1980) 2 SCC 565 : 1980 SCC (Cri) 465, the purpose of granting bail is set out with great felicity as follows: (SCC pp. 586-88, paras 27-30)

¶73

“ 27.It is not necessary to refer to decisions which deal with the right to ordinary bail because that right does not furnish an exact parallel to the right to anticipatory bail. It is, however, interesting that as long back as in 1924 it was held by the High Court of Calcutta in Nagendra Nath Chakravarti, In re 1923 SCC OnLine Cal 318 : AIR 1924 Cal 476 that the object of bail is to secure the attendance of the accused at the trial, that the proper test to be applied in the solution of the question whether bail should be granted or refused is whether it is probable that the party will appear to take his trial and that it is indisputable that bail is not to be withheld as a punishment. In two other cases which, significantly, are the ‘Meerut Conspiracy cases’ observations are to be found regarding the right to bail which deserve a

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special mention. In K.N. Joglekar v. R. 1931 SCC OnLine All 60: AIR 1931 All 504 it was observed, while dealing with Section 498 which corresponds to the present Section 439 of the Code, that it conferred upon the Sessions Judge or the High Court wide powers to grant bail which were not handicapped by the restrictions in the preceding Section 497 which corresponds to the present Section 437. It was observed by the court that there was no hard-and-fast rule and no inflexible principle governing the exercise of the discretion conferred by Section 498 and that the only principle which was established was that the discretion should be exercised judiciously. In R. v. H.L. Hutchinson 1931 SCC OnLine All 14 : AIR 1931 All 356, AIR p. 358 it was said that it was very unwise to make an attempt to lay down any particular rules which will bind the High Court, having regard to the fact that the legislature itself left the discretion of the court unfettered. According to the High Court, the variety of cases that may arise from time to time cannot be safely classified and it is dangerous to make an attempt to classify the cases and to say that in particular classes a bail may be granted but not in other classes. It was observed that the principle to be deduced from the various sections in the Criminal Procedure Codewas that grant of bail is the rule and refusal is the exception. An accused person who enjoys freedom is in a much better position to look after his case and to properly defend himself than if he were in custody. As a presumably innocent person he is therefore entitled to freedom and every opportunity to look after his own case. A presumably innocent person must have his freedom to enable him to establish his innocence.

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28. Coming nearer home, it was observed by Krishna Iyer, J., in Gudikanti Narasimhulu v High Court of A.P.(1978) 1 SCC 240 : 1978 SCC (Cri) 115 that: (SCC p. 242, para 1)

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‘ 1. … the issue [of bail] is one of liberty, justice, public safety and burden of the public treasury, all of which insist that a developed jurisprudence of bail is integral to a socially sensitised judicial process.… After all, personal liberty of an accused or convict is fundamental, suffering lawful eclipse only in terms of “procedure established by law”. The last four words of Article 21 are the life of that human right.’

¶79

29. In Gurcharan Singh v. State (UT of Delhi) (1978) 1 SCC 118: 1978 SCC (Cri) 41 it was observed by Goswami, J., who spoke for the court, that: (SCC p. 129, para 29)

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‘ 29.… There cannot be an inexorable formula in the matter of granting bail. The facts and circumstances of each case will govern the exercise of judicial discretion in granting or cancelling bail.’

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30. In American Jurisprudence (2nd Edn., Vol. 8, p. 806 , para 39), it is stated:

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‘ Where the granting of bail lies within the discretion of the court, the granting or denial is regulated, to a large extent, by the facts and circumstances of each particular case. Since the object of the detention or imprisonment of the accused is to secure his appearance and submission to the jurisdiction and the judgment of the court, the primary inquiry is whether a recognizance or bond would effect that end.’

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It is thus clear that the question whether to grant bail or not depends for its answer upon a variety of circumstances, the cumulative effect of which must enter into the judicial verdict. Any one single circumstance cannot be treated as of universal validity or as necessarily justifying the grant or refusal of bail.”

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********

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24. Article 21 is the ark of the covenant so far as the fundamental rights chapter of the Constitutionis concerned. It deals with nothing less sacrosanct than the rights of life and personal liberty of the citizens of India and other persons. It is the only article in the fundamental rights chapter (along with Article 20) that cannot be suspended even in an emergency [see Article 359(1) of the Constitution]. At present, Article 21 is the repository of a vast number of substantive and procedural rights post Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India(1978) 1 SCC 248 ….’

¶88

13. Further this Court in Sanjay Chandra v. CBI (2012) 1 SCC 40 : (2012) 1 SCC (Cri) 26 : (2012) 2 SCC (L&S) 397 , has observed that: (SCC p. 52, paras 21-23)

¶89

“ 21. In bail applications, generally, it has been laid down from the earliest times that the object of bail is to secure the appearance of the accused person at his trial by reasonable amount of bail. The object of bail is neither punitive nor preventative. Deprivation of liberty must be considered a punishment, unless it is required to ensure that an accused person will stand his trial when called upon. The courts owe more than verbal respect to the principle that punishment begins after conviction and that every man is deemed to be innocent until duly tried and duly found guilty.

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22. From the earliest times, it was appreciated that detention in custody pending completion of trial could be a cause of great hardship. From time to time, necessity demands that some unconvicted persons should be held in custody pending trial to secure their attendance at the trial but in such cases, ‘necessity’ is the operative test. In this country, it would be quite contrary to the concept of personal liberty enshrined in the Constitution that any person should be punished in respect of any matter, upon which, he has not been convicted or that in any circumstances, he should be deprived of his liberty upon only the belief that he will tamper with the witnesses if left at liberty, save in the most extraordinary circumstances.

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23.Apart from the question of prevention being the object of refusal of bail, one must not lose sight of the fact that any imprisonment before conviction has a substantial punitive content and it would be improper for any court to refuse bail as a mark of disapproval of former conduct whether the accused has been convicted for it or not or to refuse bail to an unconvicted person for the purpose of giving him a taste of imprisonment as a lesson”.

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Presumption of innocence

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14. Innocence of a person accused of an offence is presumed through a legal fiction, placing the onus on the prosecution to prove the guilt before the court. Thus, it is for that agency to satisfy the court that the arrest made was warranted and enlargement on bail is to be denied.

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15. Presumption of innocence has been acknowledged throughout the world. Article 14(2) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 1966 and Article 11 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 1948 acknowledge the presumption of innocence, as a cardinal principle of law, until the individual is proven guilty.”

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(7). In Paras Ram Vishnoi v. CBI, reported in, 2021 SCC OnLine SC 3606, Hon'ble Apex Court held as under :-

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"4. On consideration of the matter, we are of the view that pending the trial we cannot keep a person in custody for an indefinite period of time and taking into consideration the period of custody and that the other accused are yet to lead defence evidence while the appellant has already stated he does not propose to lead any evidence, we are inclined to grant bail to the appellant on terms and conditions to the satisfaction of the trial Court."

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8. In Javed Gulam Nabi Shaikh case(2024) 9 SCC 813 : (2025) 1 SCC (Cri) 222 , the Supreme Court while granting bail to accused incarcerated for 4 years in paras 16 and 17 held as under: (SCC p. 820, paras 16 and 17)

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“ 16. Criminals are not born but made. The human potential in everyone is good and so, never write off any criminal as beyond redemption. This humanist fundamental is often missed when dealing with delinquents, juvenile and adult. Indeed, every saint has a past and every sinner a future. When a crime is committed, a variety of factors is responsible for making the offender commit the crime. Those factors may be social and economic, may be, the result of value erosion or parental neglect; may be, because of the stress of circumstances, or the manifestation of temptations in a milieu of affluence contrasted with indigence or other privations.

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17. If the State or any prosecuting agency including the court concerned has no wherewithal to provide or protect the fundamental right of an accused to have a speedy trial as enshrined under Article 21of the Constitutionthen the State or any other prosecuting agency should not oppose the plea for bail on the ground that the crime committed is serious. Article 21of the Constitutionapplies irrespective of the nature of the crime.”

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10. In Amit Agrawal v. State (NCT of Delhi)2025 SCC OnLine Del 2789 the Delhi High Court in para 13 of the said decision has given a quick overview of the principles of bail jurisprudence by the Supreme Court which are necessary for consideration by a bail court considering the right of speedy trial of an under-trial accused. These principles are enumerated therein as follows: (SCC OnLine Del para 13)

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“ 13. …13.1. An undertrial is required to post bail in order to secure his presence at the trial, for which purpose an undertrial is handed over from the custody of the court to the custody of an appropriate surety. The effect of granting bail is not to set an undertrial completely at liberty but to release him from the custody of law and entrust him to the custody of his surety; and the surety is bound to ensure his production at the trial.

¶104

13.2. Bail may be denied if the court is not satisfied that an accused would remain available to face trial; or the court is of the view that he would intimidate witnesses or tamper with evidence or otherwise interfere in the course of justice. The ‘operative’ test that a court must apply for grant or denial of bail is the test of ‘necessity’, namely, to answer why it is necessary to detain an undertrial in custody.

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13.3. The purpose of pre-trial custody is neither ‘punitive’ nor ‘preventative’, meaning that an accused cannot be held in custody only with the intention of punishing him for an offence which is yet to be proved against him; nor is bail to be denied on the

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presumption that he would commit an offence if enlarged from custody (except where additional twin conditions prescribed by the legislature under certain special statutes).

¶109

13.4. Pertinently, bail must not be denied as a mark of disapproval of the alleged conduct of an accused; nor should it be denied for giving to an accused the taste of imprisonment as a lesson. This is a common pitfall since often times courts get swayed by the allegations contained in an FIR or a charge-sheet and tend to proceed on the textual gravity of the offences alleged, meaning that courts get blinded by the multitude of penal sections foisted against an accused by the prosecution, which builds a textual narrative in the FIR or in the charge-sheet. It is important therefore, for a court to look into the specific allegations against a particular accused and how, if at all, those allegations are supported by the material or evidence available on record.

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13.5. It is extremely important to appreciate that the consequences of pre-trial detention are grave: an accused, who is otherwise presumed innocent until proven guilty, is subject to psychological and physical deprivations of jail life; and is even prevented from contributing to the preparation of his defence.

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13.6.

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13.7. It would therefore be sacrilege for a court to disregard the presumption of innocence which enures to the benefit of an accused, while on the other hand failing to ensure speedy trial. The right to speedy trial is the flip side of the presumption of innocence. It has been held that the right to speedy trial is implicit in the broad sweep of Article 21 of the Constitution; and a procedure prescribed by law that deprives a person of liberty can only be said to be reasonable, fair and just on the anvil of Article 21 if it also ensures speedy trial”.

¶113

Learned counsel for the applicant in the facts and circumstances of the case submits that the applicant who is in jail since 17.03.2024 undertakes that if the applicant is released on bail he would appear on each and every date fixed in the trial and he will not misused the liberty of bail granted by this Court and will cooperate in trial and would also not influence the prosecution witnesses.

¶114

Learned A.G.A.as well as learned counsel for the informant/complainant have opposed the prayer of the applicant. However, they could not dispute the above contentions made by the applicant's counsel.

¶115

Considering the arguments advanced by the learned counsel for the applicant, learned A.G.A. and going through the contents of the application, F.I.R., as well as other relevant documents and the period of incarceration of the applicant w.e.f. 17.03.2024 and without going into the merits of the case, this Court is of the view that the application has substance and it is accordingly, allowed.

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Let the applicant - Arman be released on bail in the aforesaid case crime number on his furnishing personal bond of Rs. 25,000/- and two reliable sureties, out of which one should be of the family member, in the like amount to the satisfaction of the court

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concerned, subject to following conditions :-

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(i) The applicant will cooperate with the prosecution during trial.

¶121

(ii) The applicant will not tamper with the evidence during trial.

¶122

(iii) The applicant will not pressurize/intimidate the prosecution witness(es).

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(iv) The applicant shall not commit an offence.

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(v) The applicant shall not directly or indirectly make any inducement, threat or promise to any person acquainted with the facts of the case so as to dissuade him from disclosing such facts to the court or to any police officer or tamper with the evidence.

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(vi) The applicant shall remain present before the trial court on each date fixed, either personally or through counsel.

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(vii) The applicant will not seek any adjournment on the dates fixed for evidence when the witnesses are present in court.

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(viii) The applicant shall remain present, in person, before the trial court on the dates fixed for recording of statement under Section 313 Cr.P.C.

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In case of default of above conditions it shall be open for the trial court to treat it as abuse of liberty of bail and pass orders in accordance with law.

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As this order relates to enlargement of the applicant on bail, it is clarified that observations made in this order shall have no bearing on the merits of the case and the trial court shall not be influenced by any observation made in this order.

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(Saurabh Lavania,J.)

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January 20, 2026 ML/-

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Digitally signed by :- MUNNA LAL High Court of Judicature at Allahabad, Lucknow Bench

Arman v. State of U.P. Thru. Prin. Secy. Home Lko. and 3 Others

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Arman v. State of U.P. Thru. Prin. Secy. Home Lko. and 3 Others

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