Anil Kumar @ Anil Yadav vs State of U.P. Thru. Prin. Secy. Home Lko. and Another

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HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT ALLAHABAD LUCKNOW

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APPLICATION U/S 482 No. - 3227 of 2026

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Anil Kumar @ Anil Yadav

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.....Applicant(s)

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Versus

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State Of U.P. Thru. Prin. Secy. Home Lko. And Another .....Opposite Party(s) Counsel for Applicant(s) : Ramakar Shukla Counsel for Opposite Party(s) : G.A., Abhinav Singh

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Court No. - 14

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HON'BLE SUBHASH VIDYARTHI, J.

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Heard Sri Ramakar Shukla, the learned counsel for the petitioners, Sri Sanjay Kumar, the learned A.G.A. appearing on behalf of the State and Shri Abhinav Singh, Advocate who has filed his vakalatnama on behalf of the respondent No.2, which is taken on record.

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By means of the instant petition filed under Section 482 Cr.P.C. the petitioners have sought quashing of the charges-sheet dated 13.11.2014, summoning order dated 23.03.2015 as well as the entire proceedings of Case No.340 of 2023, arising out of Case Crime No.494 of 2014, under Sections 354 I.P.C. and Section 3(1)(xi) of SC/ST Act relating to Police Station Kurebhar, District Sultanpur pending in the Court of learned Special Judge, SC/ST Act, Court No.2, Sultanpur.

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The parties have arrived at an amicable settlement through a compromise dated 09.04.2026.

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In Gian Singh v. Sate of Punjab: (2012) 10 SCC 303 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that the High Court can quash the criminal proceedings in exercise of its inherent powers to secure the ends of justice or to prevent to abuse the process of any Court, having regard to the nature and gravity of the crime. Heinous and serious offences of mental depravity like murder, rape, dacoity etc. cannot befittingly be quashed on the basis compromise as these are not private in nature and have a serious impact on the society.

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A482 No. 3227 of 2026

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In Narinder Singh v. State of Punjab: (2014) 6 SCC 466 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court reiterated that under Section 482 Cr.P.C., the High Courts have inherent power to quash the criminal proceedings even in the cases which are not compoundable where the parties have settled the matter. The Supreme Court has held as follows: -

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"29.1. Power conferred under Section 482 of the Code is to be distinguished from the power which lies in the Court to compound the offences under Section 320 of the Code. No doubt, under Section 482 of the Code, the High Court has inherent power to quash the criminal proceedings even in those cases which are not compoundable, where the parties have settled the matter between themselves. However, this power is to be exercised sparingly and with caution.

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29.2. When the parties have reached the settlement and on that basis petition for quashing the criminal proceedings is filed, the guiding factor in such cases would be to secure:

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(i) ends of justice, or

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(ii) to prevent abuse of the process of any court.

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While exercising the power the High Court is to form an opinion on either of the aforesaid two objectives.

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29.3. Such a power is not to be exercised in those prosecutions which involve heinous and serious offences of mental depravity or offences like murder, rape, dacoity, etc. Such offences are not private in nature and have a serious impact on society. Similarly, for the offences alleged to have been committed under special statute like the Prevention of Corruption Act or the offences committed by public servants while working in that capacity are not to be quashed merely on the basis of compromise between the victim and the offender.

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29.4. On the other hand, those criminal cases having overwhelmingly and predominantly civil character, particularly those arising out of commercial transactions or arising out of matrimonial relationship or family disputes should be quashed when the parties have resolved their entire disputes among themselves.

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29.5. While exercising its powers, the High Court is to examine as to whether the possibility of conviction is remote and bleak and continuation of criminal cases would put the accused to great oppression and prejudice and extreme injustice would be caused to him by not quashing the criminal cases.

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29.6. Offences under Section 307 IPC would fall in the category of heinous and serious offences and therefore are to be generally treated as crime against the society and not against the individual alone. However, the High Court would not rest its decision merely because there is a

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mention of Section 307 IPC in the FIR or the charge is framed under this provision. It would be open to the High Court to examine as to whether incorporation of Section 307 IPC is there for the sake of it or the prosecution has collected sufficient evidence, which if proved, would lead to proving the charge under Section 307 IPC. For this purpose, it would be open to the High Court to go by the nature of injury sustained, whether such injury is inflicted on the vital/delicate parts of the body, nature of weapons used, etc. Medical report in respect of injuries suffered by the victim can generally be the guiding factor. On the basis of this prima facie analysis, the High Court can examine as to whether there is a strong possibility of conviction or the chances of conviction are remote and bleak. In the former case it can refuse to accept the settlement and quash the criminal proceedings whereas in the latter case it would be permissible for the High Court to accept the plea compounding the offence based on complete settlement between the parties. At this stage, the Court can also be swayed by the fact that the settlement between the parties is going to result in harmony between them which may improve their future relationship.

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29.7. While deciding whether to exercise its power under Section 482 of the Code or not, timings of settlement play a crucial role. Those cases where the settlement is arrived at immediately after the alleged commission of offence and the matter is still under investigation, the High Court may be liberal in accepting the settlement to quash the criminal proceedings/investigation. It is because of the reason that at this stage the investigation is still on and even the charge-sheet has not been filed. Likewise, those cases where the charge is framed but the evidence is yet to start or the evidence is still at infancy stage, the High Court can show benevolence in exercising its powers favourably, but after prima facie assessment of the circumstances/material mentioned above. On the other hand, where the prosecution evidence is almost complete or after the conclusion of the evidence the matter is at the stage of argument, normally the High Court should refrain from exercising its power under Section 482 of the Code, as in such cases the trial court would be in a position to decide the case finally on merits and to come to a conclusion as to whether the offence under Section 307 IPC is committed or not. Similarly, in those cases where the conviction is already recorded by the trial court and the matter is at the appellate stage before the High Court, mere compromise between the parties would not be a ground to accept the same resulting in acquittal of the offender who has already been convicted by the trial court. Here charge is proved under Section 307 IPC and conviction is already recorded of a heinous crime and, therefore, there is no question of sparing a convict found guilty of such a crime."

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In Parbatbhai Aahir v. State of Gujarat, (2017) 9 SCC 641 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court further laid down the following principles: -

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"16.1. Section 482 preserves the inherent powers of the High Court to prevent an abuse of the process of any court or to secure the ends of justice. The provision does not confer new powers. It only recognises and preserves powers which inhere in the High Court.

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16.2. The invocation of the jurisdiction of the High Court to quash a first information report or a criminal proceeding on the ground that a settlement has been arrived at between the offender and the victim is not the same as the invocation of jurisdiction for the purpose of compounding an offence. While compounding an offence, the power of the court is governed by the provisions of Section 320 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. The power to quash under Section 482 is attracted even if the offence is non-compoundable.

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16.3. In forming an opinion whether a criminal proceeding or complaint should be quashed in exercise of its jurisdiction under Section 482, the High Court must evaluate whether the ends of justice would justify the exercise of the inherent power.

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16.4. While the inherent power of the High Court has a wide ambit and plenitude it has to be exercised (i) to secure the ends of justice, or (ii) to prevent an abuse of the process of any court.

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16.5. The decision as to whether a complaint or first information report should be quashed on the ground that the offender and victim have settled the dispute, revolves ultimately on the facts and circumstances of each case and no exhaustive elaboration of principles can be formulated.

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16.6. In the exercise of the power under Section 482 and while dealing with a plea that the dispute has been settled, the High Court must have due regard to the nature and gravity of the offence. Heinous and serious offences involving mental depravity or offences such as murder, rape and dacoity cannot appropriately be quashed though the victim or the family of the victim have settled the dispute. Such offences are, truly speaking, not private in nature but have a serious impact upon society. The decision to continue with the trial in such cases is founded on the overriding element of public interest in punishing persons for serious offences.

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16.7. As distinguished from serious offences, there may be criminal cases which have an overwhelming or predominant element of a civil dispute. They stand on a distinct footing insofar as the exercise of the inherent power to quash is concerned.

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16.8. Criminal cases involving offences which arise from commercial, financial, mercantile, partnership or similar transactions with an essentially civil flavour may in appropriate situations fall for quashing where parties have settled the dispute.

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16.9. In such a case, the High Court may quash the criminal proceeding if in view of the compromise between the disputants, the possibility of a conviction is remote and the continuation of a criminal proceeding would cause oppression and prejudice; and

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16.10. There is yet an exception to the principle set out in propositions 16.8. and 16.9. above. Economic offences involving the financial and economic well-being of the State have implications which lie beyond the domain of a mere dispute between private disputants. The High Court would be justified in declining to quash where the offender is involved in an activity akin to a financial or economic fraud or misdemeanour. The

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consequences of the act complained of upon the financial or economic system will weigh in the balance."

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The guiding factors in these cases would be to secure the ends of justice and to prevent the abuse of process of any court. The heinous and serious offences of mental depravity or offences like murder, rape, dacoity etc., are not private in nature and they have a serious impact on the society. Cases involving such offences cannot be quashed on the basis of compromise. On the other hand, criminal cases having overwhelmingly and predominantly civil character, particularly those arising out of commercial transactions or arising out of matrimonial relationship or family disputes should be quashed when the parties have resolved their entire disputes among them.

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In the present case, the offences are essentially and predominantly private in nature, are not heinous and do not have a serious impact on society. It has also to be seen that after the parties have entered into a settlement the possibility of conviction is remote and bleak and continuation of criminal cases would only result in persecution of the petitioners.

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In these circumstances, the quashing of criminal proceedings on the basis of a compromise appears to be proper and expedient in the interest of justice. However, it is necessary that the genuineness of the compromise be verified by the Chief Judicial Magistrate.

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Accordingly, the present petition is disposed off by directing the petitioners to file an application before the Chief Judicial Magistrate concerned for verification of the genuineness of the compromise. For this purpose, the original compromise annexed as Annexure No.4 to the petition be returned to the learned counsel for the petitioners after retaining its photocopy on record. The Chief Judicial Magistrate shall verify the genuineness of the compromise and shall prepare a report in this regard expeditiously. The petitioners are granted liberty to file a fresh petition for quashing of the criminal proceedings, along with the verification report of the Chief Judicial Magistrate concerned.

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April 20, 2026 -Amit K-

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(Subhash Vidyarthi,J.)

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Digitally signed by :- AMIT KUMAR High Court of Judicature at Allahabad, Lucknow Bench

Anil Kumar @ Anil Yadav v. State of U.P. Thru. Prin. Secy. Home Lko. and Another

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Anil Kumar @ Anil Yadav v. State of U.P. Thru. Prin. Secy. Home Lko. and Another

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