U.P. Expressway Industrial Development Auth. Thru. Chief Executive Officer Lko. vs Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Auth. Lko. and 4 Others

Heard Sri Abhineet Jaiswal, the learned counsel for the petitioner, Sri Ashish Saxena, the learned Standing Counsel appearing on behalf of the State and Shri Amit Jaiswal, Advocate, who has filed his vakalatnama on behalf of the opposite party No.2 to 4 and the same is taken on record.

¶12

By means of the instant petition filed under Article 227 of the Constitution of India the petitioner has challenged the validity of an award dated 14.08.2023, passed by Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Officer, Lucknow in Reference Case No.34 of 2022 Jagdish Prasad and others Vs. State of UP. and another , whereby the reference filed by the opposite party Nos. 2 to 5 against the land acquisition award dated 06.03.2020 has been allowed. The petitioner has filed an application for review of the aforesaid order along with an application for condonation of delay in filing review. The application has been rejected by means of an order dated 04.12.2025 and the petitioner has challenged the validity of the said order also.

¶13

Submission of the learned counsel for the petitioner is that when order under challenge has been passed without jurisdiction hearing should not be denied merely on the ground of delay, more particularly when the authority adversely affected is a public body.

¶14

Briefly stated, the facts of the case are that the land of opposite parties no.2 to 5 was acquired for construction of an expressway and the award was declared on 06.03.2020. The award shows that the opposite parties were

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A227 No. 737 of 2026

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heard before passing the same and their objections had been taken into consideration while passing the award. The compensation amount of Rs 24,69,899/- was paid to the opposite party no.2 as per the aforesaid award by transferring the same to her bank account on 19.03.2020. Thereafter, the opposite parties no.2 to 5 filed reference under Section 64 of Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013 on 03.06.2020, although, reference petition makes a mention of the date of its preparation as 23.03.2020. The petitioner filed objections against the reference. The reference has been allowed by means of a judgment and order dated 14.08.2023.

¶18

The learned counsel for the petitioner has submitted that Section 64 of the Act provides that a person who was represented in the acquisition proceedings may file a reference within period of six weeks from the date of the award. The opposite parties were represented during the land acquisition proceedings and they could have filed an award within a period of six weeks from the award but reference has been after about three months.

¶19

The second submission of learned counsel for the petitioner is that the opposite parties no.2 to 5 have accepted the amount under the award without any protest. Therefore, they have no right to challenge the validity of the award.

¶20

The learned counsel for the petitioner has relied upon a decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Commercial of Income Tax and Ors. v. Chhabil Dass Agarwal (2014) 1 SCC 603.

¶21

The learned Standing Counsel appearing on behalf of the State of U.P. (the opposite party no.6) has opposed the petition stating that the petitioner has a remedy of filing an appeal under Section 74 of the Act which would be before this court.

¶22

Elaborating upon the entertainability of a writ petition under Article 226 before the High Court in a case where a statutory remedy lies before the High Court itself, the Hon'ble Supreme Court, in Rikhab Chand Jain v. Union of India 2025 SCC OnLine SC 2510, has observed that:

¶23

9. While deciding whether to entertain a petition under article 226 bearing in mind the precedents in the field, a writ court ought to additionally notice the forum designated by the statute for the litigant to approach. This is necessary because the alternative forum that is provided by the statute has to be one

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which can dispense speedy and efficacious relief. However, as in the present case, if the statutorily designated alternative forum happens to be the High Court itself whose jurisdiction under article 226 is invoked and not any ordinary statutory functionary/Tribunal, refusal to entertain the petition should be the rule and entertaining it an exception.

¶27

10. We may profitably refer, in this context, to the Constitution Bench decision in Thansingh Nathmal v. Superintendent of Taxes [(1964) 15 STC 468 (SC); 1964 SCC OnLine SC 13; AIR 1964 SC 1419.] . In Thansingh Nathmal v. Superintendent of Taxes [(1964) 15 STC 468 (SC); 1964 SCC OnLine SC 13; AIR 1964 SC 1419.] , this court had the occasion to lay down a principle of law which is salutary and not to be found in any other previous decision rendered by it. The principle, plainly, is that, if a remedy is available to a party before the High Court in another jurisdiction, the writ jurisdiction should not normally be exercised on a petition under article 226, for, that would allow the machinery set up by the concerned statute to be bye-passed. The relevant passage from the decision reads as follows (page 474 in 15 STC):

¶28

"… The jurisdiction of the High Court under article 226 of the Constitution is couched in wide terms and the exercise thereof is not subject to any restrictions except the territorial restrictions which are expressly provided in the article. But the exercise of the jurisdiction is discretionary; it is not exercised merely because it is lawful to do so. The very amplitude of the jurisdiction demands that it will ordinarily be exercised subject to certain self-imposed limitations. Resort to that jurisdiction is not intended as an alternative remedy for relief which may be obtained in a suit or other mode prescribed by statute. Ordinarily the court will not entertain a petition for a writ under article 226, where the petitioner has an alternative remedy, which, without being unduly onerous, provides an equally efficacious remedy. Again the High Court does not generally enter upon a determination of questions which demand an elaborate examination of evidence to establish the right to enforce which the writ is claimed. The High Court does not therefore act as a court of appeal against the decision of a court or Tribunal, to correct errors of fact, and does not by assuming jurisdiction under article 226 trench upon an alternative remedy provided by statute for obtaining relief. Where it is open to the aggrieved petitioner to move another Tribunal, or even itself in another jurisdiction for obtaining redress in the manner provided by a statute, the High Court normally will not permit, by entertaining a petition under article 226 of the Constitution, the machinery created under the statute to be by-passed, and will leave the party applying to it

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to seek resort to the machinery so set up."

¶32

In view of the foregoing discussion, as the petitioner has got a statutory remedy of filing an appeal available to him under Section 74 of the Act and that appeal lies before this court itself although before another bench, it will not be proper for this court to entertain this petition under Article 227 of the Constitution of India exercising power of superintendence when the petitioner has got a statutory remedy of filing a regular appeal before another bench of this Court.

¶33

Accordingly, the petition is dismissed in view of availability of alternative remedy. Let the certified copies filed with the petition be returned to the learned counsel for the petitioner to enable him to file a statutory appeal.

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February 23, 2026 -Amit K-

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(Subhash Vidyarthi,J.)

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Digitally signed by :- AMIT KUMAR High Court of Judicature at Allahabad, Lucknow Bench

U.P. Expressway Industrial Development Auth. Thru. Chief Executive Officer Lko. v. Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Auth. Lko. and 4 Others

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U.P. Expressway Industrial Development Auth. Thru. Chief Executive Officer Lko. v. Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Auth. Lko. and 4 Others

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