Mandir Sri Mahabir Ji Trust Thru. Managing Trustee Shailesh Kumar Verma and 2 Others vs Sri Kant Verma

Heard Sri Prashant Chandra Senior Advocate assisted by Sri Karunanidhi Yadav and Ms. Geetika Yadav Advocates, the learned counsel for the petitioners and Sri Avanish Kumar Singh, learned counsel for the opposite party.

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By means of the instant petition filed under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, the petitioners have challenged the validity of an order dated 03.10.2025 passed by the learned Additional District Judge, Court No. 17, Lucknow in Misc. Case No. 345/2024, allowing an application filed by the opposite party - Sri Kant Verma, under Section 18 of the Religious Endowments Act, 1863 (hereinafter referred to as 'Act of 1863') seeking leave to file a suit under Section 14 of the Religious Endowments Act, 1863. The opposite party stated in the

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application seeking leave to file a suit that his father late Mahadev Prasad Verma had solemnized two marriages. He has mentioned his pedigree which is as follows:-

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(पुत्री) (पुत्री)

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Late Mahadev Prasad Verma had constructed a temple of Sri Mahavir Ji and Maa Annapurna and he had executed a trust-deed dated 19.10.1973 forming Mandir Sri Mahabir Ji Trust settling his self acquired properties in favour of the deity. Sri Mahadev Prasad Verma died on 12.01.1975 and thereafter, his son Sri Ganesh Prasad started managing the trust. Smt. Jai Devi, the second wife of Mahadev Prasad and mother of the opposite party, was inducted as a trustee with a condition that she would remain a trustee till her children Laxmi Kant Verma and Sri Kant Verma (the opposite party) attain majority. The opposite party claims that this clause implies that upon attaining majority, children of Jai Devi - Laxmi Kant and Sri Kant, would become trustees. The opposite party contends that after death of Jai Devi, the trustees Late Vidyadhar Tripathi and Late Ganesh Prasad had nominated him as a trustee but Late Ganesh Prasad continued to look after the trust and he misappropriated the income of the trust.

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On 14.10.2023, the opposite party had sent a letter to Late Ganesh Prasad seeking information regarding the properties and income / expenditure of the trust but he did not give any reply and he died on

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11.12.2023. The opposite party alleged that after death of Late Ganesh Prasad, his sons - the petitioners nos. 2 and 3, are bent upon causing damage to the properties of the trust. Late Ganesh Prasad Verma had transferred some properties of the trust for the benefit of his family members between the years 1995 to the year 2008 and he had executed a lease-deed letting out a building of the trust to Indian Overseas Bank on 26.10.2022. He stated that he is a son of the original trustee and he is interested in offering worship in the temple of the trust and that he has got a prima facie case, the balance of convenience tilts in his favour and against the defendants. The opposite party has sought leave to file a suit seeking a perpetual injunction restraining the defendants from interfering in the affairs of the trust as its trustees and the properties of the trust, which have been put to personal use, be returned to the trust.

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The petitioners filed objections against the aforesaid application seeking leave to institute a suit inter alia stating that the opposite party has never been a trustee of Mandir Sri Mahabir Ji trust and that he has no locus standi to file the suit. There was no condition in the resolution nominating Jai Devi as a trustee that upon her sons attaining majority, they would become trustees. Sri Vidyadhar Tripathi and Late Ganesh Prasad Verma had no authority to appoint the opposite party as a trustee. As per the provisions contained in the trust-deed, a trustee can be appointed or removed only by a resolution passed by the trust. No resolution was ever passed appointing the opposite party as a trustee. The opposite party is a stranger to the trust and he has no right to interfere in the activities of the trust. The petitioners no. 2 & 3 denied that their father Late Ganesh Prasad Verma had sold away any of the trust properties to outsiders to secure personal gains, on the contrary he had installed the deities and bequeathed some land to the deities with the sole intention of managing the affairs of the temple as well as the trust. The petitioners denied the allegations of misappropriation of funds of the trust and they stated that accounts of the trust are being

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maintained by a chartered accountant who prepares the balance sheet of the trust.

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The petitioners further stated in their objection that Laxmi Kant Verma, brother of the opposite party, had filed an application under Section 92 of C.P.C. against the trust and its trustee Late Ganesh Prasad Verma. The matter reached this Court through FAFO No. 51/2020 titled Laxmi Kant Verma & Another versus Mandir Shri Mahabir Ji Trust Bajranj Nagar Gosainganj & Ors., which was decided by means of a judgment dated 24.02.2020 holding that the trust-deed has constituted a private religious endowment trust.

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The application seeking leave to file the suit has been allowed by means of the impugned order dated 03.10.2025 passed by the Additional District Judge, Court No. 17, Lucknow wherein the Additional District Judge has accepted the contention of the opposite party that he was not a party to FAFO No. 51/2020. The Court has held that it appears that Late Mahadev Prasad Verma had constructed a temple and had entrusted his self acquired land to the trust. The opposite party is son of Late Mahadev Prasad Sharma and, therefore, his application seeking leave to file a suit deserves to be allowed.

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Assailing validity of the aforesaid order, Sri. Prashant Chandra, the learned senior counsel for the petitioners has submitted that previously, Laxmi Kant Verma (brother of opposite party Sri Kant Verma) and Chandra Kant, had filed Misc. Case No. 350/2013 in the Court of District Judge, Lucknow seeking leave under Section 92 C.P.C. to file a suit for redemption of accounts, income and expenditure of Mandir Sri Mahabir Ji trust, for removal of its trustees and appointment of a new managing committee of the trust. In the objections filed against the application, it was pleaded that Late Mahadev Prasad Verma had constructed a temple, installed deities therein and had donated his properties for maintenance of the temple reserving his right to manage the affairs of the temple. After

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death of Mahadev Prasad Verma, his son Late Ganesh Prasad Verma was managing the affairs of the temple, which is a family temple. It was pleaded therein that the trust is not a public trust and the applicants are not its beneficiaries. The District Judge had passed a temporary injunction directing the parties to maintain status quo, after recording a satisfaction that the trust is a public trust and not a private trust.

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9.

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An application was filed for recall of the said order stating that the Court had passed the interim injunction without deciding the application seeking leave to file suit under Section 92 of C.P.C. and that there was no evidence to prove that the trust in question is a public trust, which issue was yet to be decided. Interim injunction could not have been granted prior to grant of leave. The recall application was rejected by an order dated 05.07.2014.

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The validity of the aforesaid orders passed by the Additional District Judge were challenged by filing Writ Petition No. 4299 (M/S) of 2014 titled Mandir Sri Mahabirji Trust Lko Thru Manager/Managing Trustee versus The District Judge, Lucknow & Others. This writ petition was allowed by means of judgment and order dated 01.08.2014 and the orders dated 29.01.2014 and 05.07.2014 were set aside holding that the suit could only be filed with the leave of the Court whereas leave had not been granted. The Court also observed that a perusal of application for seeking leave shows that there is no whisper of the fact that the trust in question is a public trust, which is a condition precedent for maintainability of a suit under Section 92 C.P.C., whereas the other side has categorically pleaded that it is not a public trust. This Court observed that the Court below neither referred to the pleading of the parties nor evidence on record. Such an approach is illegal. The Court is not supposed to travel beyond the pleadings of the parties. The finding that the trust is a public trust, is not based upon consideration of any evidence on record. Accordingly, the matter was remanded directing the learned Additional District Judge to decide the application seeking leave

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first after hearing the parties in accordance with law. The aforesaid order dated 01.08.2014 was challenged in Special Appeal No. 481/2014, which was dismissed by means of a judgment and order dated 26.08.2014.

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Thereafter, the application seeking leave to file suit under Section 92 of C.P.C. was rejected by means of an order dated 16.01.2020 passed by the learned Additional District Judge, Court No. 7, Lucknow holding that the settler of the trust late Mahadev Prasad Verma has specifically stated in the trust deed that he has constituted the trust for the management of Sri Mahabir Ji Mandir and the trust deed does not contain any provision beneficial to the public at large. The manager of the trust would be a member of the family of the settler of the trust. Relying upon a decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Deoki Nandan v. Murlidhar : AIR 1957 SC 133, the learned Additional District Judge held that the trust in question is a private trust and, therefore, there was no ground for granting leave to file suit in respect of the affairs of the trust under Section 92 of C.P.C.

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The aforesaid order dated 16.01.2021 was challenged by filing First Appeal From Order No. 51/2020 which was dismissed by means of a judgment and order dated 24.02.2020 wherein this Court held as follows:

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“Analysing the present case in the light of principles embodied in the apex court judgment, it is found that the trust deed succinctly provides that the endowments stand dedicated for maintenance of temple and shall vest in the deity. The management of the dedicated properties circumscribed amongst the family descendants of the founder trustee is yet another significant dimension which leans towards the nature of trust being a private Hindu Religious Endowment Trust.

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This Court may also note that by virtue of Section 92(2) CPC, for any trust which falls within the trappings of Religious Endowments Act, 1863, no relief specified in Section 92(1) CPC would lie through a suit under the said Rule.

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Lastly learned counsel for the appellants has submitted that the public worship and the dedicated properties being utilised for public purpose in terms of the registered rules of administration have altered the status of the trust to be public, hence the impugned order passed by the Court below is in gross violation of law.

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The submissions made are attractive but unconvincing. The rules registered subsequently cannot eclipse the intention of trust deed but are rather a guidance for management evolved subsequently. This Court may note that the dedicated properties are a means to preserve the religious heritage which is inclusive of deity worship of Lord Hanuman unlike in Islam, Christianity or Judaism. A temple constructed for worship by all without there being any intention of receiving offerings from worshipers to maintain the same is strongly a circumstance that supports the case of the respondents. Therefore, this Court is of the considered opinion that the trust deed under consideration essentially constitutes a private Religious Endowment Trust , hence the impugned judgment/order passed by the court below refusing to grant leave under Section-92 CPC for want of elaborate discussion does not suffer from any illegality in the eyes of law.”

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(Emphasis added)

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The aforesaid judgment and order dated 24.02.2020 was challenged by filing S.L.P. (Civil) No. 10234/2020, which was dismissed by means of an order dated 04.09.2020. Thereafter, a review petition (Civil) Diary No. 27546/2020 was filed seeking review of the order dated 04.09.2020 and this too was dismissed by means of an order dated 05.05.2021.

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When the application seeking leave to file the suit filed by Laxmi Kant Verma remained unsuccessful up to the Hon’ble Supreme Court, his brother Sri Kant Verma has again filed an application seeking leave to file suit on the basis of similar allegations.

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The learned counsel for the petitioners has submitted that Sections 14 & 18 of Act of 1863 and Section 92 of C.P.C. apply to public trusts and not to private trusts. In support of this contention he has placed reliance on a Constitution Bench judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Mahant Ram Saroop Dasji v. S.P. Sahi : 1959 SCC

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OnLine SC 93, wherein the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that “The Act of 1863 and Section 92 of the Civil Procedure Code - both apply to public trusts; they have no application to private trusts.”

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In Kuldip Chand v. Advocate-General to Govt. of H.P. & Ors. : (2003) 5 SCC 46, it was held that: -

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“43. This Court in Mahant Ram Saroop Dasji v. S.P. Sahi, Special Officer-in-charge of Hindu Religious Trusts [AIR 1959 SC 951] traced the history of public trust and pointed out that whereas under English law all trusts should be public trusts, under Hindu law, there may be private trust also. It was held that all the statutes operating in the field including Section 92 of the Code of Civil Procedure apply to public trust alone.

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44. In Bihar State Board Religious Trust v. Mahant Sri Biseshwar Das [(1971) 1 SCC 574] this Court upon noticing the decision of the Privy Council in Babu Bhagwan Din v. Gir Har Saroop [AIR 1940 PC 7] observed: (SCC p. 580, para 15)

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“Thus, the mere fact of the public having been freely admitted to the temple cannot mean that courts should readily infer therefrom dedication to the public. The value of such public user as evidence of dedication depends on the circumstances which give strength to the inference that the user was as of right. No such evidence of any reliable kind was available to the appellant Board in the instant case.”

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45. This Court held that the charitable trust might either be created by a grant for an express purpose or a grant having been made in favour of an individual or a class of individuals, that individual or that class of individuals might, after obtaining the grant, create a charitable trust but here there is no evidence as regards such grant.

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46. Yet again in Radhakanta Deb v. Commr., H.R.E. [(1981) 2 SCC 226] upon taking into consideration a large number of decisions of the Privy Council as also of this Court, it was observed:

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“12. It may thus be noticed that this Court has invariably held that the mere fact that the members of the public used to visit the temple for the purpose of worship without any hindrance or freely admitted therein would not be a clear indication of the nature of the endowment. It is manifest that whenever a dedication is made

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for religious purposes and a deity installed in a temple, the worship of the deity is a necessary concomitant of the installation of the deity, and therefore, the mere factum of worship would not determine the nature of the endowment. Indeed if it is proved that the worship by the members of the public is as of right that may be a circumstance which may in some cases conclusively establish that the endowment was of a public nature.”

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49. We furthermore fail to understand as to why the public in general did not exercise their right, if any, in respect of the suit premises for a long time and at least since 1963.

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50. It may be that a part of the Dharamsala in question was used by the general public for a long time but continuance of such a benevolent act/charity would not lead to creation of a trust which alone is the determinative factor for entertaining a suit at the instance of the Advocate-General in terms of Section 92 of the Code of Civil Procedure.”

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The learned counsel for the petitioners has next submitted that if a document is available to prove the nature and origin of the endowment and such document shows that management of the temple is retained with the founder, it would be a conclusive proof to show that the endowment was of a private nature. In support of this submission he has placed reliance on a judgment in the case of Radha Kanta Deb v. Commr. of Hindu Religious Endowments : (1981) 2 SCC 226, wherein it was held that: -

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“14 (3) Where, however, a document is available to prove the nature and origin of the endowment and the recitals of the document show that the control and management of the temple is retained with the founder or his descendants, and that extensive properties are dedicated for the purpose of the maintenance of the temple belonging to the founder himself, this will be a conclusive proof to show that the endowment was of a private nature...”

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Per contra, Sri Avanish Kumar Singh, the learned counsel for the opposite party has submitted that the earlier suit was filed by Laxmi Kant Verma whereas the present application seeking leave to file the suit has been filed by the opposite party Sri Kant Verma, who was not a party to the earlier suit. Therefore, the findings recorded in the earlier suit are

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not binding on the opposite party-applicant and the judgment rendered in FAFO No. 51/2020, is not a judgment in rem. He has further submitted that the impugned order date 03.10.2025 is a well reasoned and speaking order and there is no ground to challenge the same in exercise of this Court’s supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 as this jurisdiction is an extremely limited supervisory jurisdiction, which is not akin to the appellate jurisdiction wherein this Court can examine factual findings.

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The learned counsel for the petitioner has also submitted that Section 92 C.P.C. pertains to administrative reliefs in respect of public trusts wheres Section 14 of the Religious Endowment Act, 1863 governs situations of misfeasance, breach of trust and personal misuse of endowed property and dismissal of an application under Section 92 C.P.C. as not maintainable, would not create a bar against entertaining application under Section 14 of the Religious Endowments Act, 1863. He has submitted that Section 14 of the Religious Endowments Act, 1863 does not restrict its application to public trusts only. However, he has not cited any case-law in support of these submissions.

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Having considered the aforesaid facts and circumstances of the case and submissions advanced by the learned counsel for the parties, I am of the considered view that the question whether the trust in question is a public trust, has already been decided in the negative by means of a judgment and order dated 24.02.2020 passed by a Coordinate Bench of this Court in FAFO No. 51/2020. The judgment was challenged by filing an SLP which was dismissed by means of an order dated 04.09.2020 wherein it is recorded that “Having heard the learned counsel for the petitioners and carefully perusing the material placed on record, we see no reason to interfere with the impugned order passed by the High Court. The special leave petition is accordingly dismissed'.”

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The application seeking review of the order dismissing the SLP, was also dismissed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court. Thus, the order passed by

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this Court holding the trust in question to be a private trust, has attained finality.

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A judgment of this Court deciding that the trust in question is not a public trust and declaring its nature as that of a private trust is a judgment in rem and this finding is not open to be questioned by filing another application seeking leave to file a suit by the brother of the original applicant who had previously instituted the proceedings.

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In Jagdish Narain Tandon v. State of U.P. : 2022 SCC OnLine All 428, a coordinate bench of this Court held that: -

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“50. This Court while allowing the appeal of one of the trustees had decreed the Suit No. 1268 of 1968, declaring “Tandon Trust’ not to be a charitable and religious trust. Once, the character and status of the trust was declared by this Court, which remained unchallenged by the present defendants-respondents since 1981, cannot change the nature and hold the same to be guided by the Act of 1920 on the strength of Government Notification dated 07.07.1972 published in Gazette on 15.07.1972.

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51. As this Court, on 21.10.1981, having decreed the Suit of 1968, the declaration as to the status will be from the date of institution of the Suit and not from the pronouncement of the judgment. Moreover, the judgment rendered on 21.10.1981 was a judgment in rem, as it declared the status of the trust, and not in personam as claimed by the defendants-respondents and held by the Courts below.

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52. A declaration of the status is always in rem and not in personam. The relief of declaration is for the world to know about the status of the person in favour of whom the declaration has been made.

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53. In Booz-Allen & Hamilton Inc. (Supra), the Apex Court held that a right in rem is a right exercisable against the world at large as contrasted from the right in personam which is an interest protected solely against specific individuals. Actions in personam referred to actions determining the rights and interests of the parties themselves in the subject matter of the case, whereas actions in rem referred in actions determining the title of property and rights of the parties, not merely among themselves, but also against all persons at any time claiming an interest in that property.

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54. Correspondingly, the judgment in personam refers to a judgment against a person as distinguished judgment against a thing, right or status and judgment in rem refers to a judgment that determines the status or conditions of property which operates directly on the property itself.

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55. In the present case, the Court while decreeing the Suit of K.N. Shivpuri had declared the status of the “Tandon Trust’, not being a charitable and a religious trust covered under the Act of 1920. The declaration made by the Court as to the status of the trust is to the world at large and not to any particular party in a suit, as it affects people at large.”

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24.In the present case, the contention made by Laxmi Kant Verma, brother of the opposite party Shri Kant Verma, that Sri. Mahabir Ji Mandir Trust is a public trust, has already been rejected in the judgment dated 24.02.2020 passed in FAFO No. 51/2020 titled Laxmi Kant Verma & Another versus Mandir Shri Mahabir Ji Trust Bajranj Nagar Gosainganj & Ors., wherein this Court has held that the trust deed under consideration essentially constitutes a private Religious Endowment Trust. The challenge made to the judgment dated 24.02.2020 through S.L.P. (Civil) No. 10234/2020 remained unsuccessful and the S.L.P. was dismissed by means of an order dated 04.09.2020. Thereafter a review petition (Civil) Diary No. 27546/2020 was filed seeking review of the order dated 04.09.2020 and this too was dismissed by means of an order dated 05.05.2021. When the application seeking leave to file the suit filed by Laxmi Kant Verma remained unsuccessful up to the Hon’ble Supreme Court, his brother Sri Kant Verma has again filed an application seeking leave to file a suit on the basis of similar allegations. There rightly is no averment in the application seeking leave to file a suit that Mandir Sri Mahabir Ji Trust is a public trust, as the issue that the trust is a private trust has been decided in the judgment dated 24.02.2020 passed in FAFO No. 51/2020, which is a judgment in rem. Therefore, the opposite party has no locus standi to file an application seeking leave to file a suit for injunction against the trust which has conclusively been held to be a private trust. The learned

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Additional District Judge has not adverted to this aspect of the matter while granting leave to the opposite party-applicant which vitiates the impugned order dated 03.10.2025.

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The contention of the learned Counsel for the opposite party that Section 14 of the Act of 1863 does not restrict its application to public trusts only, cannot be accepted in view of the law laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Mahant Ram Saroop Dasji v. S.P. Sahi : AIR 1959 SC 951, that “ The Act of 1863 and Section 92 of the Civil Procedure Code, - both apply to public trusts; they have no application to private trusts .”

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Accordingly, the petition is allowed . The impugned judgment and order dated 03.10.2025 passed by the learned Additional District Judge, Court No. 17, Lucknow in Misc. Case No. 345/2024 allowing an application filed by the opposite party - Sri Kant Verma, seeking leave to file a suit under Section 14 of the Act of 1863 is set aside. The leave application stands rejected. The parties shall bear their own costs of litigation.

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(Subhash Vidyarthi,J.)

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February 10, 2026 Pradeep/-

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Digitally signed by :- PRADEEP SINGH High Court of Judicature at Allahabad, Lucknow Bench

Mandir Sri Mahabir Ji Trust Thru. Managing Trustee Shailesh Kumar Verma and 2 Others v. Sri Kant Verma

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Mandir Sri Mahabir Ji Trust Thru. Managing Trustee Shailesh Kumar Verma and 2 Others v. Sri Kant Verma

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