Allowed

Dharm Veer Singh Yadav v. State of U.P. Thru Secy. Home Deptt. Civil Sectt. Lko and Ors.

Allahabad HC7 Mar 2025WRIC/1003711/2014

Case brief

AI extract

What is this about?

Arms licence cancelled on grounds of petitioner's involvement in criminal cases despite acquittals; writ petition allowed, orders quashed, licence restored.

What did the court decide?

Impugned orders quashed; opposite parties directed to restore petitioner's arms license forthwith subject to relevant formalities; parties bear own costs.

Dharm Veer Singh Yadav Vs State of U.P. Thru… — Writ and Judicial Review | Allahabad HC (2025)

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Neutral Citation No. - 2025:AHC-LKO:14160

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Court No. - 19

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Case :- WRIT - C No. - 1003711 of 2014

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Petitioner :- Dharm Veer Singh Yadav Respondent :- State Of U.P. Thru Secy. Home Deptt. Civil Sectt. Lko And Ors

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Counsel for Petitioner :- Anil Kumar Awasthi Counsel for Respondent :- C.S.C.

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Hon'ble Manish Mathur,J.

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Heard Mr. Anil Kumar Awasthi learned counsel for petitioner and learned State Counsel for opposite parties.

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Petition has been filed challenging order dated 3rd November, 2012 passed under Section 17(3) of the Arms Act cancelling petitioner's arms license. Also under challenge is the order dated 21st May, 2014 rejecting petitioner's appeal.

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It has been submitted that the order passed under Section 17(3) of the Act has been passed only on the ground of petitioner being named in three separate first information reports. It is submitted that the finding recorded of apprehension of breach of peace is not based on any cogent evidence or discussion in the impugned order and has been inserted only for the purposes of compliance of Section 17(3) of the Act.

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Learned counsel has also drawn attention to the supplementary affidavit dated 8th May, 2024 to submit that the petitioner had earlier been named in three first information reports being:-

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(a) Case crime No. 74 of 1998 where Sessions Trial No. 258 of 1998 under Sections 325, 323, 504, 506 and 342 IPC in which the petitioner was already acquitted by means of judgment and order dated 28th May, 1999.

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(b) Case crime No. 1252 of 2008 under Sections 394, 384, 386, 323, 504, 506, 352, 341 IPC read with Sections 3(2)(v) SC/ST Act in which also final report dated 11th January, 2008 was submitted and was accepted by the court concerned vide order dated 11th April, 2015.

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(c) Case crime No. 276 of 2012 under Sections 147, 307, 385, 504, 506 IPC read with Section 3(2)(5) SC/ST Act in which also the petitioner has been acquitted by means of judgment and order dated 12th January, 2017.

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It is also submitted that co-accused of petitioner Manoj Gupta who was also named in the case Crime No. 376 of 2011 also had his arms license cancelled but his writ petition filed thereagainst being Writ C No.1003982 of 2014 has thereafter been allowed by means of judgment and order dated Ist April, 2022; reasoning of which is applicable upon petitioner also.

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Learned State Counsel on the basis of counter affidavit has refuted submissions advanced by learned counsel for petitioner with the submission that it is quite evident from the impugned order that petitioner's involvement with regard to aforesaid criminal case is not

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denied and therefore specific finding has been recorded by the authority with regard to apprehension of breach of peace and is in consonance with Section 17(3) of the Arms Act. It is submitted that acquittal of petitioner subsequent to passing of impugned orders is immaterial and is not required to be considered in the present facts and circumstances. It is therefore submitted that since there is substantial compliance of Section 17(3) of the Arms Act in the impugned orders, no interference is required.

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Upon consideration of submissions advanced by learned counsel for parties and perusal of material on record, it is evident from the impugned orders that petitioner's arms license has been cancelled on account of his being named in three criminal cases as noticed herein above. It is also relevant that impugned order has been passed taking into account the earlier first information report filed in the year 1998 as case crime No. 74 of 1998 in which petitioner was acquitted by means of judgment and order dated 28th May, 1999 and does not appear to have been taken into account in the impugned order. In such circumstances, non application of mind by the authority concerned is quite evident.

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Even otherwise it is noticeable that the arms license has been cancelled in the year 2012 while placing reliance on a case which was registered in the year 1998-2008. The order impugned does not indicate as to how apprehension of breach of peace has been considered at such a belated stage without any such apprehension in the preceding years.

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The aspect of cancellation of arms license only on the basis of involvement of the licensee in a criminal case has already been adjudicated in a number of decisions of this Court.

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In Masiuddin Vs. Commissioner, Allahabad Division, Allahabad and another reported in 1972 A.L.J. 573 this Court held in paragraph Nos. 4 and 7 as follows:

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"4. After a license is granted, the right to hold the license and possess a gun is a valuable individual right in a free country. The security of public peace and public safety is a valuable social interest. Section 17 shows that Parliament had decided that neither of the two valuable interests should unduly impinge on the other Section 17 seeks to establish a fair equilibrium between the two contending interests. It says: Hear the licensee first; and then cancel the license "if necessary for the security of the public peace or for public safety". True, there is no express provision for hearing. True, there is no express provision for hearing. But the nature of the right affected, the language of Sec. 17, the grounds for cancellation, the requirement of a reasoned order and the right of appeal plainly implicate a fair hearing procedure. Jai Narain Rai v. District Magistrate, Azamgarh. While cancelling a licence, the District Magistrate acts as a quasi-judicial authority.

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7. A license may be cancelled, inter alia on the ground that it is "necessary for the security of the public peace or for public safety" to do so. The District Magistrate has not recorded a finding that it was necessary for the security of the public peace or for public safety to revoke the license. The mere existence of enmity between a licensee and another person would not establish the ''necessary' connection with security of public peace or public safety. There should be something more than mere enmity. There should be some evidence of the provocative utterances of the

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licensee or of his suspicious movements or of his criminal designs and conspiracy in reinforcement of the evidence of enmity. It is not possible to give an exhaustive list of facts and circumstances from which an inference of threat to public security or public peace may be deduced. The District Magistrate will have to take a decision on the facts of each case. But in the instant case there is nothing in his order to indicate that it was necessary for the security of the public peace or for public safety to cancel the license of the petitioner. Mere enmity is not sufficient."

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In the Full Bench decision of this Court in the case of Chhanga Prassad Sahu versus State of U.P. reported in 1984 AWC 145 (FB) it has been held that it is obligatory upon the licensing authority while revoking/suspending arms license to record reasons in writing pertaining to existence of aspects indicated in Section 17(3) of the Act. Relevant paragraphs of the judgment are as follows:-

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"A perusal of abovementioned provisions indicates that the licensing authority has been given the power to suspend or revoe an arms licence only if any of the conditions mentioned in sub-clauses (a) to (e) of subsection (3) of Section 17 of Act exists." sub section (5) of Section 17 makes it obligatory upon the licensing authority to, while passing the order revoking/suspending an arms licence, record in writing the reasons therefore and to, on demand, furnish a brief statement thereof to the holder of the license unless it considers that it will not be in the public interest to do so."

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In paragraph-9 it has been emphasised as under:-

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"it is true that in order to revoke/suspend an arms licence, the licensing authority has necessarily to come to the conclusion that the facts justifying revocation/suspension of licence mentioned in grounds (a) to (e) of section 17 exist"

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Similarly a Division Bench of this Court in the case of Sheo Prasad Misra versus District Magistrate Basti and others reported in 1978 Allahabad Weekly Cases, 122, (D.B.) has also held as follows:-

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4. "Learned Counsel for the petitioner contended that, while there was material before the licencing authority, viz., the District Magistrate, to show that some reports had been lodged against the petitioner, there was neither any material to warrant a conclusion that it was necessary to cancel the licence for security of public peace or public safety nor was a finding to that effect recorded. Learned Counel referred us to a decision of this Court in case of Masi Uddin v. Commissioner, Allahabad, 1972 ALJ 572, where this Court held:

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"A licence may be cancelled, inter alia, on the ground that it is "necessary for the security of public peace or for public safety, to do so. The District Magistrate has not recorded a finding that it was necessary for the security of the public peace or for public safety to revoke the licend. The mere existence of enmity between a licencee and another person would not establish the "necessary" connection with security of the public peace or public safety."

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In case before us also the District Magistrate has not recorded any finding that it was necessary to cancel the licence for the security of public peace

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or for public safety. All that he has done is to have referred to some applications and reports lodged against the petitioner. The mere fact that some reports had been lodged against the petitioner could not form basis for cancelling the licence. The order passed by the District Magistrate and that passed by the Commissioner cannot, therefore, be upheld on the basis of any thing contained in Sections 17(3) (b) of the Act"

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In the case o f Thakur Prasad versus State of U.P. , reported in 2013(31) LCD 1460 (LB) the distinction between public peace or public safety has been indicated to mean safety of public at large and not ordinary disturbance of law and order considering only a few persons. Relevant paragraphs of the aforesaid judgment are as follows:-

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"10. "Public peace" or ''public safety" do not mean ordinary disturbance of law and order public safety means safety of the public at large and not safety of few persons only and before passing of the order of cancellation of arm license as per Section 17 (3) of the Act the Licensing Authority is under an obligation to apply his mind to the question as to whether there was eminent danger to public peace and safety involved in the case in view of the judgment given by this court in the case of Ram Murli Madhukar v. District Magistrate, Sitapur [1998 916) LCD 905], wherein it has been held that license can not be suspended or revoked on the ground of public interest (Jan-hit) merely on the registration of an F.I.R. and pendency of a criminal case."

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11. Further, this Court in the case of Habib v. State of U.P. 2002 ACC 783 held as under:

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"The question as to whether mere Involvement in a criminal case or pendency of a criminal case can be a ground for revocation of the licence under Arms Act, has been dealt with by a Division Bench of this Court in Sheo prasad Misra Vs. District Magistrate, Basti and Others, 1978 AWC 122, wherein the Division Bench relying upon the earlier decision in Masi Uddin Vs. Commissioner, Allahabad, 1972 ALJ 573, found that mere involvement in criminal case cannot, in any way, affect the public security or public interest and the order cancelling or revoking the licence of fire arm has been set aside. The present impugned orders also suffer from the same infirmity as was pointed out by the Division Bench in the above mentioned cases. I am in full agreement with the view taken by the Division Bench that these orders cannot be sustained and deserves to be quashed and are hereby quashed.

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There is yet another reason that during the pendency of the present writ petition, the petitioner has been acquitted from the aforesaid criminal case and at present there is neither any case pending, nor any conviction has been attributed to the petitioner, as is evident from Annexure SA-I and II to the supplementary affidavit filed by the petitioner. In this view of the matter, the petitioner is entitled to have the fire-arm licence."

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14 In view of the law settled as indicated herein before, it is evident that mere pendency of a criminal case against a licensee is not a ground to cancel the fire arms license and even otherwise involvement in such a criminal case which does not affect public at large but only a few individuals can not come within aspect of apprehension of breach of peace with regard to public peace or public safety.

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Upon applicability of aforesaid judgments in the present facts and circumstances of the case, it is obvious that petitioner's fire arms license has been cancelled primarily on the ground of his involvement in the aforesaid criminal cases. As has been held herein above, mere involvement in or pendency of criminal case against a licensee can not be ground for cancellation of arms license. Similarly public peace or public safety is not attracted in the present case where such apprehension has not been disclosed to be against the public at large but only with regard to safety of few persons.

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Considering aforesaid discussion, the impugned orders dated 3rd November, 2012 and 21st May, 2014 being unsustainable are hereby quashed by issuance of writ in the nature of Certiorari.

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Resultantly the petition succeeds and is allowed. Parties to bear their own cost. The opposite parties are hereby directed to restore the arms license of petitioner forthwith subject to completion of relevant formalities.

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Order Date :- 7.3.2025 prabhat

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Digitally signed by :- PRABHAT KUMAR High Court of Judicature at Allahabad, Lucknow Bench

Dharm Veer Singh Yadav v. State of U.P. Thru Secy. Home Deptt. Civil Sectt. Lko and Ors.

Case brief

What is this about?

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Dharm Veer Singh Yadav v. State of U.P. Thru Secy. Home Deptt. Civil Sectt. Lko and Ors.

Case brief

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