Dismissed

Devndra Kumar Dixit v. Superintendant of Police Hardoi

Allahabad HC19 Dec 2025WRIA/5820/2002

Case brief

AI extract

What is this about?

The petitioner, a police constable, filed a writ petition seeking quashing of a dismissal order. The petitioner argued the punishment was excessive as the enquiry officer recommended only reduction in pay, and alleged procedural disadvantages. The Court held that enquiry recommendations are not binding, the disciplinary authority had jurisdiction to impose dismissal for bigamy, and no procedural l

What did the court decide?

The writ petition is dismissed with no order as to costs.

Devndra Kumar Dixit Vs Superintendant of Police… — Service and Employment | Allahabad HC (2025)

¶1

Reserved on : 03.12.2025 Delivered on : 19.12.2025

¶2

HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT ALLAHABAD LUCKNOW

¶3

WRIT	– A No. - 5820 o	f 2002
Devndra Kumar Dixit			…..Peti	tioners(s)
	Versus
Superintendant Of Police Hardoi			…..Respo	ndents(s)
Counsel for Petitioners(s) Counsel for Respondent(s)	: R.N.Gupta, Pankaj Gup Kedar Dube : C.S.C.	Mohan ta, Prav y, Tushar	Chandra een Tripat Gupta	Dikshit, hi, Ram

¶4

Court No. - 25

¶5

HON'BLE AMITABH KUMAR RAI, J.

¶6

(1) Heard Shri Pankaj Gupta, learned counsel for the petitioner and learned Standing Counsel appearing for the State-respondents.

¶7

(2) This petition has been filed seeking relief for quashing of the punishment order dated 10.08.2002, whereby the petitioner has been dismissed from service.

¶8

(3) The brief facts shorn of unnecessary details are that the petitioner, who was working on the post of Constable in the Civil Police was issued a charge-sheet dated 16.07.2001 and disciplinary

¶9

¶10

WRIT-A No. - 5820 of 2002

¶11

proceedings against the petitioner under the provisions of Rule 14 of U.P. Police Officers of the Subordinate Ranks (Punishment and Appeal) Rules, 1991 (hereinafter referred to as “Rules, 1991” ) were initiated. The charge against the petitioner was that he contracted another marriage on 10.08.1998 during the subsistence of his earlier marriage, which was solemnized in the year 1985-86. The disciplinary proceedings were initiated on a complaint made by the first wife of the petitioner, Smt. Surya Mukhi. Before issuing the charge-sheet, a preliminary enquiry was also conducted and thereafter regular disciplinary proceedings were initiated against the petitioner.

¶12

(4) The enquiry officer, after following due process, concluded the enquiry proceedings and submitted his enquiry report dated 11.07.2002, in which the charge against the petitioner of bigamy was found to be proved. The enquiry officer, while submitting the enquiry report dated 11.07.2002, also recommended the punishment of reduction to the next lower pay scale for one year. A bare perusal of the enquiry report indicates that proper opportunity was given to the petitioner and the witnesses were also examined to prove the charge against the petitioner.

¶13

(5) From the statements of the witnesses recorded in the enquiry report, it transpires that the first wife of the petitioner was aware of the second marriage of the petitioner and was also living with the petitioner and the second wife, namely, Smt. Kumud.

¶14

¶15

WRIT-A No. - 5820 of 2002

¶16

However, due to some dispute regarding the monthly expenses which were being paid to the first wife, Smt. Surya Mukhi, she made a complaint alleging bigamy as she wanted half of the salary of the petitioner. It has nowhere been disputed in the enquiry report that the petitioner contracted the second marriage with Smt. Kumud during the subsistence of his first marriage with his wife, Smt. Surya Mukhi. Out of the wedlock with Smt. Kumud, the second wife, the petitioner had one daughter and out of the wedlock with the first wife, Smt. Surya Mukhi, he had two daughters.

¶17

(6) The disciplinary authority, after receiving the enquiry report dated 11.07.2002, issued a show cause notice dated 22.07.2002 to the petitioner, enclosing therewith a copy of the enquiry report and granting 15 days’ time to the petitioner to submit his reply to the show cause notice. The petitioner did not submit any reply to the show cause notice, which was received by him on 24.07.2002 within the stipulated 15 days; rather, he submitted an application seeking a further 15 days’ time for submitting the reply on the pretext that he wanted to peruse the records and the enquiry report.

¶18

(7) The disciplinary authority, considering the fact that the enquiry report had already been supplied to the petitioner while issuing the show cause notice dated 22.07.2002 and that the petitioner was seeking time for filing reply merely as a delaying tactic,

¶19

¶20

WRIT-A No. - 5820 of 2002

¶21

proceeded to pass the order of punishment dated 10.08.2002, dismissing the petitioner from the service. The petitioner, without availing the remedy of appeal as provided under Rule 20 of Rules 1991, filed the instant writ petition challenging the punishment order of dismissal dated 10.08.2002. The entire case of the petitioner as per the averments made in the writ petition, is based on the fact that since the enquiry officer recommended the punishment of reduction in pay for one year, the disciplinary authority could not have passed an order of dismissal.

¶22

(8) During the course of arguments, learned counsel for the petitioner has emphasized that there was no documentary evidence to prove the second marriage of the petitioner and no finding had been recorded by the enquiry officer in the enquiry report with regard to second marriage. As such, the punishment order based on such enquiry report is perverse, as the charge of bigamy could not be conclusively proved by the enquiry officer. It was also argued that sufficient time was not given for filing of reply to the show cause notice, as the request seeking extension of time for filing the reply was not entertained and the disciplinary authority proceeded to pass the punishment order.

¶23

(9) This Court, after going through the enquiry report, finds that the allegation of second marriage of the petitioner was neither disputed by the first wife nor by the second wife of the petitioner. In fact, both of them made statements before the enquiry officer

¶24

¶25

WRIT-A No. - 5820 of 2002

¶26

that they had married the petitioner and that out of the wedlock they both had children. The petitioner, during the course of enquiry, never confronted his wives to negate the finding of second marriage. Thus, it cannot be said that the enquiry officer failed to prove the second marriage of the petitioner.

¶27

(10) Appendix-I of the Rules, 1991 prescribes the procedure relating to conduct of the departmental proceedings against the police officer with reference to Rule 14(1) of the Rules, 1991. The proviso in the Appendix also empowers the enquiry officer to make his own recommendation regarding the punishment to be imposed on the charged police officer. Appendix-I of Rules 1991 is reproduced hereinbelow :-

¶28

“ APPENDIX-I

¶29

PROCEDURE RELATING TO THE CONDUCT OF

¶30

DEPARTMENTAL PROCEEDINGS

¶31

AGAINST POLICE OFFICER

¶32

[See RULB 14(1)]

¶33

Upon institution of a formal enquiry such Police Officer against whom the inquiry has been instituted shall be informed in writing of the grounds on which was proposed to take action and shall be afforded an adequate opportunity of defending himself. The grounds on which it is proposed to take action shall be used in the form of a definite charge or charges as in Form-1 appended to these Rules which shall be communicated to the charged Police Officer and which shall be so clear and precise as to give sufficient indication to the charged Police Officer, of the facts and circumstances against him. He shall be required, within a reasonable time, to put in, in a written statement of his defence and to state, whether he desires to be

¶34

¶35

WRIT-A No. - 5820 of 2002

¶36

heard in person. If he so desires, or if the Inquiry Officer so directs an oral enquiry shall be held in respect of such of the allegation as are not admitted. At that enquiry such oral evidence will be recorded as the Inquiry Officer considers necessary. The charged Police Officer shall be entitled to cross-examine the witnesses to give evidence in person and to have such witnesses called as he may wish:

¶37

Provided that the Inquiry Officer may for sufficient reasons to be recorded in writing refuse to call a witness. The proceedings shall contain a sufficient record of the evidence and statement of the findings and the ground thereof. The Inquiry Officer may also separately from these proceedings make his own recommendation regarding the punishment to be imposed on the charged Police Officer.”

¶38

(11) From a bare perusal of the Appendix-I, it transpires that the enquiry officer, as per his discretion, may also separately make a recommendation regarding the punishment to be imposed on the charged police officer, which is not mandatory, as the word used for such recommendation is “may” and not “shall”. The disciplinary authority, after due consideration of the enquiry report, may, as per his own wisdom, exercises power to impose any of the penalties as provided under Rule 4 of the Rules, 1991. The recommendation of the enquiry officer can never be binding on the disciplinary authority while passing the order of punishment, as it is only a recommendation which may be taken into consideration by the disciplinary authority.

¶39

¶40

WRIT-A No. - 5820 of 2002

¶41

(12) Rule 7(3) of the Rules, 1991 empowers the Superintendent of Police to award any of the punishments mentioned in Rule 4 on such police officers who are below the rank of Sub-Inspector. The petitioner was holding the post of Constable; hence, the Superintendent of Police, Hardoi was fully empowered to impose the punishment of dismissal and the discretion vested in him under Rule 7(3) cannot be restricted on the basis of the recommendation of the enquiry officer.

¶42

(13) Apart from that, this Court finds that the entire enquiry proceedings against the petitioner were conducted after following due procedure as contained in the Rules, 1991 and there is no procedural defect in the conduct of the disciplinary proceedings or in the passing of the punishment order dated 10.08.2002. Once the petitioner has been found guilty of bigamy in the enquiry report, it is within the domain of the disciplinary authority to impose punishment. The disciplinary authority, as per his wisdom and the power vested in him under the statutory provisions has passed the order of punishment, which does not require interference by this Court in exercises of its power under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.

¶43

(14) In fact, the petitioner has also admitted in paragraph 4 of the rejoinder affidavit, filed in reply to the counter affidavit of the department, that he solemnized the second marriage with Smt. Kumud on 10.06.1998 with the consent of his first wife, namely,

¶44

¶45

WRIT-A No. - 5820 of 2002

¶46

Smt. Suraj Mukhi. The said paragraph 4 is reproduced hereinbelow :-

¶47

“4. That in reply to the contents of para 3(1) of the counter affidavit it is submitted that the deponent performed second marriage with Kumud on 10.6.98 with the consent of his first wife namely Smt. Suraj Mukhi and both were living together under one roof with Devendra Kumar Dixit, the deponent. It is also worthy to mention here that they lived together till September 2002 and no complaint was made by the first wife about the second marriage before the authorities against the deponent but it is only due to mischief of Smt. Suraj Mukhi.”

¶48

(15) Thus, there is no denial on the part of the petitioner that he entered into a second marriage during the subsistence of first marriage, which amounts to a violation of Section 29 of the U.P. Government Servants’ Conduct Rules, 1957.

¶49

(16) It is needless to mention that the scope of writ jurisdiction while dealing with issues relating to disciplinary proceedings is limited. The power of judicial review is confined to the decision-making process and the power of judicial review conferred on a Constitutional Court or Tribunal is limited.

¶50

(17) In State of A.P. v. S. Sree Rama Rao : AIR 1963 SC 1723 , a three-Judge Bench of Supreme Court held that the High Court is not a court of appeal over the decision of the authorities holding a departmental inquiry against a public servant. It is concerned only with determining whether the inquiry was held by a competent

¶51

¶52

WRIT-A No. - 5820 of 2002

¶53

authority, in accordance with the prescribed procedure and whether the rules of natural justice were violated.

¶54

(18) In B.C. Chaturvedi v. Union of India : 1996 SCC (L&S) 80 , a three-Judge Bench of Supreme Court held that power of judicial review is not an appeal from a decision but a review of the manner in which the decision is made. Power of judicial review is meant to ensure that the individual receives fair treatment and not to ensure that the conclusion which the authority reaches is necessarily correct in the eyes of the court. The court/tribunal in its power of judicial review does not act as an appellate authority to re-appreciate the evidence and to arrive at its own independent findings on the evidence.

¶55

(19) In High Court of Bombay v. Shashikant S. Patil : (2000) 1 SCC 416 , Supreme Court held that interference with the decision of departmental authorities is permitted if such authority had held proceedings in violation of the principles of natural justice or in violation of statutory regulations prescribing the mode of such inquiry while exercising jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution.

¶56

(20) In State Bank of Bikaner & Jaipur v. Nemi Chand Nalwaya : (2011) 4 SCC 584 , Supreme Court held that the courts will not act as an appellate court and reassess the evidence led in the domestic enquiry, nor interfere on the ground that another view is possible

¶57

¶58

WRIT-A No. - 5820 of 2002

¶59

on the material on record. If the inquiry has been fairly and properly held and the findings are based on evidence, the question of adequacy of the evidence or the reliable nature of the evidence will not be ground for interfering with the findings in departmental Inquiries.

¶60

(21) In another judgment reported as Union of India v. P. Gunasekaran : (2015) 2 SCC 610 , Supreme Court held that while re-appreciating evidence the High Court cannot act as an appellate authority in the disciplinary proceedings. The Court laid down the parameters as to when the High Court shall not interfere in the disciplinary proceedings : (SCC p. 617, para 13)

¶61

“13. Under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution of India, the High Court shall not:

¶62

(i) reappreciate the evidence;

¶63

(ii) interfere with the conclusions in the enquiry, in case the same has been conducted in accordance with law;

¶64

(iii) go into the adequacy of the evidence;

¶65

(iv) go into the reliability of the evidence;

¶66

(v) interfere, if there be some legal evidence on which findings can be based.

¶67

(vi) correct the error of fact however grave it may appear to be;

¶68

(vii) go into the proportionality of punishment unless it shocks its conscience.”

¶69

¶70

WRIT-A No. - 5820 of 2002

¶71

(22) In view of the aforesaid proposition of law laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court and the analysis of the facts of the present case as recorded hereinabove, this Court finds no illegality or infirmity in the order of dismissal dated 10.08.2002.

¶72

(23) In view of the above discussion, the present writ petition fails and is accordingly dismissed .

¶73

(24) No order as to costs.

¶74

(Amitabh Kumar Rai, )

¶75

December 19, 2025 Shubhankar

¶76

Digitally signed by :- SHUBHANKAR THAKUR High Court of Judicature at Allahabad, Lucknow Bench

Devndra Kumar Dixit v. Superintendant of Police Hardoi

Case brief

What is this about?

What did the court decide?

Devndra Kumar Dixit v. Superintendant of Police Hardoi

Case brief

What is this about?

What did the court decide?

What the court decided

A compact analysis

Issues for consideration

Cases cited

Statutes considered

Parties & counsel

Coram

Case details

Similar cases

Smt. Uma Upadhyay and 3 Others vs State of U.P. Thru. Prin. Secy. Home Lko. and Another

M/S Tekriwal Cold Traders Thru. Its Prop. Rakesh Tekriwal vs State of U.P. Thru. Prin. Secy. Home Deptt. Govt. Lko. and Another

Sankata Prasad and 2 Others vs State of U.P. Thru. Prin. Secy. Deptt. of Home Lko. and Another

Naveet Nigham vs Sanjay Prasad, Prin. Secy., Home, Civil Secrtt. Govt. of U.P., Lko. and Others

Water Plant Thru. Proprietor Virendra Bhati and Another vs Union of India,Ministry of Finance Deptt. of Financial Services,New Delhi Thru. Secy. and 2 Others

Pankaj Panwar @ Pankaj Singh Panwar and 3 Others vs State of U.P. Thru. Prin. Secy. Lko. and 2 Others