Gauri Shankar Pal vs State of U.P. Thru. Prin./ Addl. Chief Secy., Revenue, Lko. and Others

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Neutral Citation No. - 2025:AHC-LKO:29370

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Court No. -7

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Case :- CIVIL MISC REVIEW APPLICATION No. - 63 of 2025

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Applicant :- Gauri Shankar Pal Opposite Party :- State Of U.P. Thru. Prin./ Addl. Chief Secy., Revenue, Lko. And Others Counsel for Applicant :- Prashansa Singh Counsel for Opposite Party :- C.S.C.

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Hon'ble Saurabh Lavania,J.

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Heard.

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Present review application under Chapter V Rule 12 of the Allahabad High Court Rules, 1952 has been preferred by the petitioner in relation to final judgment and order dated 11.04.2025 passed in Writ-B No. 311 of 2005 (Gauri Shankar Pal Versus State of U.P.and Others). The relevant portion of the judgment in issue, reads as under:-

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" 6. This case relates to allotment of chak(s), as such, before proceeding further, it would be useful to refer some judgments of this Court on the issue involved and the relevant provision of the U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act, 1953 (in short "Act of 1953").

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Section- 19(1)(e) of the Act of 1953 is as follows:-

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"19. Conditions to be fulfilled by a Consolidation Scheme.-(1) A consolidation scheme shall fulfill the following conditions, namely, (a)......

(b)......

(c)......

(d)......

(e) every tenure-holder is, as far as possible, allotted a compact area at the place where he holds the largest part of his holding :

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Provided that no tenure-holder may be allotted more chaks than three, except with the approval in writing of the Deputy Director of Consolidation:

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Provided further that no consolidation made shall be invalid for the reason merely that the number of chaks allotted to a tenureholder exceeds three."

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From reading of Section 19(1)(e) and considering the case of the parties, it is clear that consolidation Authorities can not pass arbitrary order. It is no doubt correct that during chak allotment proceedings, the allotment cannot be made in such a manner which may satisfy every tenure holder but the consolidation authorities are required follow the mandate of the Act/Rules, as explained by the judicial pronouncements.

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In the context of this case, the following observations of the judgment passed by this Court in the case of Asbaran v. Deputy Director of Consolidation, Gonda; 1986 A.W.C. 1088, are relevant.

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“This provision contained in Section 19(1)(f) enjoins upon the consolidation authorities to allot plot on which exists his private source of irrigation or any other improvement. Apart from it, no other provisions of Section 19 of the Act enjoins upon the consolidation authorities to make allotment of chak to the tenure-holder on his original plot and the consolidation authorities in view of provisions contained in Section 19(1)(e) of the Act are required to allot, as far as possible, a compact area to the tenure-holder at place where he holds largest part of his holding. The word as far as possible occurring in Section 19(1)(e) of the Act cannot be construed so as to give an unfettered discretion to the consolidation authorities in not making an allotment of a chak of compact area at place where the tenure holder holds his largest part of holding. It while making allotment of a chak to the tenure holder the Consolidation Officer finds it difficult to make allotment of chak to him of a compact area at a place where he held the largest part of his holding, then, he has to assign reasons for not doing so. If no good reasons are shown, the allotment would certainly be held to be irregular and cannot be sustained. The aforesaid provisions contained in Section 19(1)(e) of the Act, however, cannot be construed to make it imperative on the consolidation authorities to allot chak of compact area to a tenure holder be imperatively including therein some plot of his original holding. The requirement of said provision, in my opinion, is that the tenure holder has to be allotted a chak of a compact area at a place where he holds the largest part of his holding and not on the plot of his largest part of holding. In making allotment of chaks equity amongst various tenure holders has got to be adjusted, and, as such, if it is not possible to include some of the original land of the tenure holder in the allotted chak; then the allotment of chak cannot be said to be invalid or without jurisdiction, on the ground that no plot of original holding of the tenure holder has been included in his chak although a chak of compact area has been allotted at a place and in the vicinity where the tenure holder holds the

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largest part of his holding. The requirement of allotting original plot of the holding to the tenure holder in his chak has been mandated only in Section 19(1)(f), according to which, if there exists private source of irrigation or other improvement on the plot in question, then it has got to be allotted in the chak of the tenure holder. The allotment of chak in violation of the provision contained in Section 19(1)(f) would certainly make allotment illegal being violative of specific provisions. But in my opinion, an allotment of a ‘Uran’ Chak cannot be taken to be illegal and without jurisdiction if such a chak has been allotted at a place quite near the original land held by the tenure holder in its vicinity and not excessively exceeding the valuation of his original plots in that sector.”

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In the above case, this Court held that in view of the provision of Section 19(1)(e) the consolidation authorities are required to allot as far as possible a compact area to the tenure holder at a place where he holds the largest part of the holding and the judgment also says that the aforesaid provision can be construed to make it imperative on the consolidation authorities to allot chak of compact area to a tenure holder including therein some plot of his original holding.

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In the judgment passed in the case of Mukut Nathi v. The Deputy Director of Consolidation, Gorakhpur; 1998 R.D. 148, this Court held in paragraph 5 as under:-

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“The Consolidation Officer and Settlement Officer of Consolidation have carved out the chak of the petitioner in such a way that its shape was rectangular and was leading up to the P.W.D. road. The Deputy Director of Consolidation for the first time carved out a chak in rectangular shape running from north to south, with the result that the petitioner was deprived of the land towards P.W.D. road. The Deputy Director of Consolidation has not recorded any finding as to whether under the sale deed any specified portion was sold to the petitioner. In case the petitioner was sold a portion which did not lead up to P.W.D. road, the Deputy Director of Consolidation may be justified not to give such portion to the petitioner but if this portion was not specified or he was given a portion which leads up to the P.W.D. road, the order of the Deputy Director of Consolidation will not be valid and justified.”

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In respect to cases where the interference in the allotment of chaks is permissible under Article 226, the issue has been considered by this Court in Writ Petition (Cons.) No. 5001 of 1983 (Ram Udit Vs. D.D.C. & others) decided on 24.09.2014 and in para 29 to 32, this Court has said as under:-

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"29. It is not in dispute that the allotment of Chaks is to be made taking into consideration principles laid down under Section 19 of Act 1953. These principles have been considered by this Court in Bechan Singh Vs. Deputy Director of Consolidation and others 1985 AWC 604 All. In para 4 thereof, this Court has said that allotment of Chak has to be made consistent with the principles, namely, (i) every tenure holder should be allotted compact area at the place where he holds largest part of his holding (ii) the tenure holder, as far as possible, should be allotted the plot on which exists his private source of irrigation or any other improvement together with the area in the vicinity equal to valuation of the plot originally held by him and (iii) every tenure holder, as far as possible, would be allotted Chak in conformity with the process of rectangulation. The Court further held that the area held by tenture holder prior to start of consolidation proceedings, is relevant only to ascertain whether the area allotted to the tenure holder, varies by more than 25% or not, as contained in the first proviso of Section 19 of the Act, 1953.

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In Dr. A.N. Srivastava Vs. DDC 1982 LLJ 42 Hon'ble K. N. Misra J. referring to Section 19(1)(e) of Act 1953 said: "The petitioners under the provisions of Section 19 (1) (e) of the Act were entitled to get a chak at a place where they had held largest part of their original holding. The words 'as for as possible' used in the said sub-section do not confer any jurisdiction upon the consolidation authorities to act arbitrarily ignoring the provisions contained therein. The Settlement Officer (Consolidation) while altering the chak of the petitioners should have assigned reasons for not making allotment to the petitioners on the aforesaid plots Nos. 1082 and 1087 which were admittedly largest part of their holding. In my opinion the words as far as possible used in Section 19 (1) (e) of the Act require the provisions contained therein to be followed unless their compliance cannot be made for specific reasons to be assigned for it"

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(emphasis added)

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This was reiterated in Samai Lal Vs. Deputy Director of Consolidation, Pratapgarh and others 1985 LLJ 330 and the Court further said:

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"In the present case the Assistant Consolidation Officer appears to have acted illegally and in violation of the provisions contained in Section 19 (1) (e) of the Act which lays down that every tenure-holder, as for as possible, should be allotted a Chak at a place where he held his largest holding. The Assistant Consolidation Officer should have proposed a Chak of the petitioners on this very plot No. 1703 in accordance with the

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aforesaid provisions and in case it is not possible, then the reasons should have been mentioned for not allotting a Chak to the petitioners on their plot. The words "as far as possible" used in the said sub-section do not confer any jurisdiction upon the consolidation authorities to act arbitrarily, ignoring the provisions contained thereunder."

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(emphasis added)

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In Doodh Nath Vs. DDC and others 1988(6)LCD 453 the Court held, if a tenure holder has his Chak with private source of irrigation, allotment of chak must be weighed so as to keep intact private source of irrigation of such person. The Court said that there cannot be any legal justification for refusing to allot a Chak to a tenure holder at a particular place, where he had held his private source of irrigation on the ground that his sons or other relations may have been allotted a chak in its vicinity. Every tenure holder would be entitled to get allotment of chak at a place where he could be allotted chak, keeping in view the provisions contained in Section 19 of the Act. The tenure holder would be entitled to get near village Abadi so much of land which he originally held at that place and also at the place of his private source of irrigation. The Court also said that undoubtedly, while deciding objection filed by a tenure holder against proposed allotment of chaks, equities are to be adjusted taking into consideration location of original landholding of the other tenure holders whose chaks are likely to be affected while determining the objection. But while doing so, just and appropriate claim put forth by the tenure holder cannot be rejected merely on the ground that he is a big tenure holder as compared to the opposite parties or that his son or some other relation has been allotted chak near the place where the objector claims an allotment of chak as against his original holding. The Court added a few words of caution for the consolidation authorities, in the following manner:

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"In the matter of allotment of chaks a care is to be taken by the authorities to allot chak to the tenure holders to which they are entitled as against their original holdings. If appropriate chak is not allotted to a tenure holder, he sustains irreparable loss and injury for all times to come. Thus in exercise of powers under Article 226 of the Constitution, this Court is not to feel hesitant in interfering with the impugned orders which are found to be unwarranted in law and facts of the case, merely on the ground that the writ petition could not be taken up earlier for disposal. The impugned orders cannot be left to survive merely on the delay in disposal of the writ petition for no fault of the petitioner." (para-11)

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Further, as per the judgment passed in the case of Raisa Begum vs. D.D.C. and others, reported in 2011 SCC OnLine All 1930, placed before this Court by the learned counsel appearing for the side opposite, the original tenure holder is entitled to road side land. In this case, road side land was provided to the purchaser of land, which was purchased during consolidation proceedings.

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In the judgment passed in the case of Ram Badan vs. D.D.C. and others, reported in 2019 SCC OnLine All 6344, relied upon by the learned counsel appearing for the side opposite, this Court after considering the observations made in the judgment passed in the case of Ram Prasad vs. Deputy Director of Consolidation, Allahabad, reported in 2006 SCC OnLine All 1980, Ramadhar Singh vs. Depurty Director of Consolidation, reported in (2009) 106 RD 772, and Sanjay vs. Depurty Director of Consolidation, reported in (2013) 121 RD 561, in para 15 observed as under:-

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"15: The consensus of principle that emerges from the decisions in Ram Prasad (supra), Ramadhar Singh (supra) and Sanjay (supra) is that valuable roadside land that is the original holding of a tenure holder, is to be declared chak out or allotted to him as part of his Chak, unless it be imperative on account of some compelling circumstances that may require some marginal departure from the Rule. There is no finding recorded by the Deputy Director of Consolidation or the Settlement Officer that allotment of the entire area of Khasra No. 60/3 (old) to the petitioner, thar is part of the petitioner's original holding lies in front of the third respondent's Abadi and would cause the third respondent some great inconvenience or irreparable injury as spoken of in the decision of this Court in Ram Shanker (supra). The remark of the Deputy Director of Consoliderion that though it is not appropriate to include any part of this plot in the third respondent's chak as it is not part of his original holding. considering his Abadi, the same may not be disturbed as ordered by the Settlement Officer of Consolidation, is flawed. To this, is added a remark that, therefore, it would not be proper to remove the part of the plot in dispute included in the Chak of the third respondent. For one, it is not reason enough to deprive the petitioner of a substantial part of his valuable roadside land in favour of the thint respondent. Moreover, a look at the confirmed consolidation map shows that between one part of old Khasra No. 60/3 (now renumbered as 369) and included in the third respondent's chak and the third respondent's Abadi, there is a sector road running through. This confirmed map is on record as part of Annexure No. SRA-1 to the supplementary rejoinder

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affidavit dated 18th July, 2015 filed on behalf of the petitioner. There is no dispute about this."

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As per the judgment of the Hon'ble Apex Court passed in the case of Hansraj v. Mewalal and others, reported in (2019) 3 SCC 682, till holding is divided in accordance with law, every co-sharer of plot has right on the holding and chak(s) should be carved out in a manner so that everyone gets chak on pitch road.

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For coming to the conclusion on the basis of principles related to allotment of chak(s) as observed in the judgment(s), referred above, this Court considered the following facts of the case:-

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(i) According to Form-CH-23, Annexure No.2 at page 34, Gata in issue i.e. Gata No. 337/9 is the 'Mool Gata/Original Holding' of Opposite Party No.5 Chini Prasad, S/o Chhabbu and one Doodh Nath, S/o Chhabbu.

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(ii) As per averments made in paragraph 5 of the memo of revision, in which the impugned order dated 07.03.2025 has been passed, the Gata No. 337/9, in issue, belongs to opposite party No.5 to 8 namely Chini Prasad, S/o Chhabbu, Pawan Kumar S/o Hariram, Sushila W/o Hariram, Naurangi W/o Basant Kumar and over this Gata No.337/9 'Boring' was situated.

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(iii) Consolidation Officer did not provide Chak over Gata No. 337/9 to the opposite party No.5 to 8, named above, which is their 'Mool Gata/Original holding'.

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(iv) Vide impugned order dated 07.03.2025 the Deputy Director of Consolidation has provided Chak to the opposite party Nos. 5 to 8 at Gata No. 337/9, which is their 'Mool Gata/Original holding'.

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Thus, to the view of this Court the substantial justice has been done in the light of Section 19 of the Act, 1953, which can be deduced from the observations made in various pronouncements, indicated above.

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Taking note of the principles aforesaid as also the facts and reason, as indicated, this court finds no illegality in the impugned order dated 07.03.2025 and no interference in the order impugned is required by this Court in exercise of power vested under Article 226/227 of the Constitution of India.

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The petition is accordingly dismissed. Costs made easy. "

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The grounds for seeking review of judgment and order dated 11.04.2025 taken in the present application, are extracted hereinunder:-

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"[A] BECAUSE the judgment and order dated 11.04.2025 passed by learned Single Judge against which instant review petition is being preferred is based on consideration of wrong facts which were material and concealed from Hon'ble Court.

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[B] BECAUSE respondent no. 5 is the tenure holder of land gata No. 337/3 and which is the original chak of opposite party No. 5, but he conceal this fact and mentioned that he is a original chak holder of land gata No. 337/9 and in his memo of revision dated 21.03.2024 in para-11 mentioned that the land gata No. 337/9 is nearest from his home not he is the original chak holder.

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[C] BECAUSE the land gata No. 148/2 and 148/3 through registered sale-deed opposite party No. 5 hold as a original chak holder, but he conceal this facts that in para-11 of the memo of revision mentioned that the land gata No. 148 is distance from his home.

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[D] BECAUSE in the order dated 03.01.2003 passed by the Settlement Officer of Consolidation, Sultanpur in Appeal No. 183 in which opposite party No. 5 mentioned that he is original chak holder of land gata No. 148.

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[E] BECAUSE in the order dated 23.11.2023 passed by the Settlement Officer of Consolidation, Sultanpur in Appeal No. 1243 of 2023 in which specifically mentioned that the opposite party No. 5 is a original chak holder of land gata No. 337/3 not the 337/9.

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[F] BECAUSE the opposite party No. 5 has wrongly mentioned that he is the original chak holder of gata No. 337/9 and not say anything about the gata No. 148, because the opposite party No. 5 is original chak holder of gata No. 148 and he used the land for making bricks, due to which his land lable was below from the other gata situated inside of gata No. 148, which is allotted to the petitioner.

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[G] BECAUSE the opposite party No. 5 always changed his statements in primary stage to last stage and not confirm about his real position.

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[H] BECAUSE the order dated 07.03.2025 the respondent no. 2 has passed the order against the petitioner and in which 31 decimil was allotted in the gata no. 337/9 to the petitioner is cancel and only give 8 decimil in the said gata and for using of

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this land no way or not any means for using the land situated at near the house of opposite party No. 5.

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[I] BECAUSE while passing the order dated 11.04.2025 learned single judge recorded certain perverse findings, such as respondent no. 5 is original chak holder of land gata no. 337/9 and the opposite party No. 2 provided the chak to opposite parties nos. 5 to 8 at gata No. 337 which is their mool gatas or their original holdings."

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After discussing a series of decisions on review jurisdiction in Kamlesh Verma v. Mayawati reported in (2013) 8 SCC 320, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has observed that review proceedings have to be strictly confined to the scope and ambit of Order XLVII Rule 1, CPC. As long as the point sought to be raised in the review application has already been dealt with and answered, parties are not entitled to challenge the impugned judgment only because an alternative view is possible. The principles for exercising review jurisdiction were succinctly summarized in the captioned case as below:

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“20. Thus, in view of the above, the following grounds of review are maintainable as stipulated by the statute:

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20.1. When the review will be maintainable:

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(i) Discovery of new and important matter or evidence which, after the exercise of due diligence, was not within knowledge of the petitioner or could not be produced by him;

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(ii) Mistake or error apparent on the face of the record;

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(iii) Any other sufficient reason.

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The words “any other sufficient reason” has been interpreted in Chajju Ram v. Neki17, and approved by this Court in Moran Mar Basselios Catholicos v. Most Rev. Mar Poulose Athanasius18 to mean “a reason sufficient on grounds at least analogous to those specified in the rule”. The same principles have been reiterated in Union of India v. Sandur Manganese & Iron Ores Ltd.25,.

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20.2. When the review will not be maintainable:—

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(i) A repetition of old and overruled argument is not enough to reopen concluded adjudications.

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(ii) Minor mistakes of inconsequential import.

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(iii) Review proceedings cannot be equated with the original hearing of the case.

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(iv) Review is not maintainable unless the material error, manifest on the face of the order, undermines its soundness or results in miscarriage of justice.

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(v) A review is by no means an appeal in disguise whereby an erroneous decision is re-heard and corrected but lies only for patent error.

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(vi) The mere possibility of two views on the subject cannot be a ground for review.

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(vii) The error apparent on the face of the record should not be an error which has to be fished out and searched.

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(viii) The appreciation of evidence on record is fully within the domain of the appellate court, it cannot be permitted to be advanced in the review petition.

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(ix) Review is not maintainable when the same relief sought at the time of arguing the main matter had been negatived.”

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In Ram Sahu (Dead) Through LRs v. Vinod Kumar Rawat reported in 2020 SCC OnLine SC 896, the Hon'ble Supreme Court citing previous decisions and expounding on the scope and ambit of Section 114 read with Order XLVII Rule 1, has observed that Section 114 CPC does not lay any conditions precedent for exercising the power of review; and nor does the Section prohibit the Court from exercising its power to review a decision. However, an order can be reviewed by the Court only on the grounds prescribed in Order XLVII Rule 1 CPC. The said power cannot be exercised as an inherent power and nor can appellate power be exercised in the guise of exercising the power of review.

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Recently the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Sanjay Kumar Agarwal vs. State Tax Officer (1) and Another 2023 SCC OnLine SC 1406, observed as under:-

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9. In the words of Krishna Iyer J. , (as His Lordship then was) “a plea of review, unless the first judicial view is manifestly distorted, is like asking for the Moon. A forensic defeat cannot be avenged by an invitation to have a second look, hopeful of discovery of flaws and reversal of result……… A review in the Counsel's mentation cannot repair the verdict once given. So, the law laid down must rest in peace.”

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10. It is also well settled that a party is not entitled to seek a review of a judgment delivered by this Court merely for the purpose of a rehearing and a fresh decision of the case. The normal principle is that a judgment pronounced by the Court is

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final, and departure from that principle is justified only when circumstances of a substantial and compelling character make it necessary to do so.

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11. In Parsion Devi v. Sumitri Devi, this Court made very pivotal observations:—

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“9. Under Order 47 Rule 1 CPC a judgment may be open to review inter alia if there is a mistake or an error apparent on the face of the record. An error which is not self-evident and has to be detected by a process of reasoning, can hardly be said to be an error apparent on the face of the record justifying the court to exercise its power of review under Order 47 Rule 1 CPC. In exercise of the jurisdiction under Order 47 Rule 1 CPC it is not permissible for an erroneous decision to be “reheard and corrected”. A review petition, it must be remembered has a limited purpose and cannot be allowed to be “an appeal in disguise.”

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12. Again, in Shanti Conductors Private Limited v. Assam State Electricity Board, a three Judge Bench of this Court following Parsion Devi v. Sumitri Devi (supra) dismissed the review petitions holding that the scope of review is limited and under the guise of review, the petitioner cannot be permitted to reagitate and reargue the questions which have already been addressed and decided.

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13. Recently, in Shri Ram Sahu (Dead) Through Legal Representatives v. Vinod Kumar Rawat, this Court restated the law with regard to the scope of review under Section 114 read with Order XLVII of CPC.

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14. In R.P. (C) Nos. 1273-1274 of 2021 in Civil Appeal Nos. 8345-8346 of 2018 (Arun Dev Upadhyaya v. Integrated Sales Service Limited), this Court reiterated the law and held that:—

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“15. From the above, it is evident that a power to review cannot be exercised as an appellate power and has to be strictly confined to the scope and ambit of Order XLVII Rule 1 CPC. An error on the face of record must be such an error which, mere looking at the record should strike and it should not require any long-drawn process of reasoning on the points where there may conceivably be two opinions.”

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15. It is very pertinent to note that recently the Constitution Bench in Beghar Foundation v. Justice K.S. Puttaswamy (Retired), held that even the change in law or subsequent decision/judgment of co-ordinate Bench or larger Bench by itself cannot be regarded as a ground for review.

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16. The gist of the afore-stated decisions is that:—

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(i) A judgment is open to review inter alia if there is a mistake or an error apparent on the face of the record.

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(ii) A judgment pronounced by the Court is final, and departure from that principle is justified only when circumstances of a substantial and compelling character make it necessary to do so.

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(iii) An error which is not self-evident and has to be detected by a process of reasoning, can hardly be said to be an error apparent on the face of record justifying the court to exercise its power of review.

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(iv) In exercise of the jurisdiction under Order 47 Rule 1 CPC, it is not permissible for an erroneous decision to be “reheard and corrected.”

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(v) A Review Petition has a limited purpose and cannot be allowed to be “an appeal in disguise.”

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(vi) Under the guise of review, the petitioner cannot be permitted to reagitate and reargue the questions which have already been addressed and decided.

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(vii) An error on the face of record must be such an error which, mere looking at the record should strike and it should not require any long-drawn process of reasoning on the points where there may conceivably be two opinions.

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(viii) Even the change in law or subsequent decision/judgment of a co-ordinate or larger Bench by itself cannot be regarded as a ground for review.

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In the case of S.Madhusudhan Reddy Vs. V.Narayana Reddy and Others ; reported in 2 022 SCC OnLine SC 1034 , the Hon'ble Apex Court observed as under:-

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"As can be seen from the above exposition of law, it has been consistently held by this Court in several judicial pronouncements that the Court's jurisdiction of review, is not the same as that of an appeal. A judgment can be open to review if there is a mistake or an error apparent on the face of the record, but an error that has to be detected by a process of reasoning, cannot be described as an error apparent on the face of the record for the Court to exercise its powers of review under Order XLVII Rule 1 CPC. In the guise of exercising powers of review, the Court can correct a mistake but not substitute the view taken earlier merely because there is a possibility of taking two views in a matter. A judgment may also be open to review when any new or important matter of evidence has emerged after passing of the judgment, subject to the condition that such evidence was not within the knowledge

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of the party seeking review or could not be produced by it when the order was made despite undertaking an exercise of due diligence. There is a clear distinction between an erroneous decision as against an error apparent on the face of the record. An erroneous decision can be corrected by the Superior Court, however an error apparent on the face of the record can only be corrected by exercising review jurisdiction. Yet another circumstance referred to in Order XLVII Rule 1 for reviewing a judgment has been described as “for any other sufficient reason”. The said phrase has been explained to mean “a reason sufficient on grounds, at least analogous to those specified in the rule” (Refer : Chajju Ram v. Neki Ram and Moran Mar Basselios Catholicos v. Most Rev. Mar Poulose Athanasius)."

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Upon due consideration of the grounds and also the judgment passed by the Hon'ble Apex Court in the judgment passed in the case of Tamil Nadu Electricity Board and Another vs. N. Raju Reddiar and Another, (1997) 9 SCC 736 according to which review application/petition shall be filed by the same advocate/counsel, who appeared and argued the case, as also the law related to review petition, according to which the review is by no means an appeal in disguise and the scope of review is limited as also the judgment dated 11.04.2025, this Court finds no force in the present review petition for the reasons that while passing the judgment dated 11.04.2025 this Court considered the relevant law on the issue pertaining to the allotment of chak(s) as also the facts of the case pleaded and thereafter held that chak(s) provided to the petitioner are just and proper and further to establish that Gata No. 337/9 is not the Mool Gata of respondent No.5 no evidence has been placed on record. Accordingly, the review application is dismissed.

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No order as to costs.

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Order Date :- 19.05.2025 Jyoti/-

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Digitally signed by :- JYOTI RAJWANI High Court of Judicature at Allahabad, Lucknow Bench

Gauri Shankar Pal v. State of U.P. Thru. Prin./ Addl. Chief Secy., Revenue, Lko. and Others

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Gauri Shankar Pal v. State of U.P. Thru. Prin./ Addl. Chief Secy., Revenue, Lko. and Others

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