Allowed

Mahesh Yadav and 4 Others v. State of U.P. Thru. Addl. Chief Secy. Home U.P. Lko. and Another

Allahabad HC28 Nov 2024/3041/2024

Case brief

AI extract

What is this about?

Application under Section 482 Cr.P.C. to quash a summoning order in a complaint arising from a matrimonial dispute; parties settled amicably via mediation agreement dated 09.08.2024 agreeing to withdraw all cases against each other; court quashed the entire complaint proceedings and allowed the application.

What did the court decide?

Entire proceedings of Complaint No.1926 of 2024 quashed; interim order discharged.

Mahesh Yadav and 4 Others Vs State of U.P. Thru… — Matrimonial and Divorce | Allahabad HC (2024)

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Neutral Citation No. - 2024:AHC-LKO:79084

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Court No. - 14

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Case :- APPLICATION U/S 482 No. - 3041 of 2024

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Applicant :- Mahesh Yadav And 4 Others Opposite Party :- State Of U.P. Thru. Addl. Chief Secy. Home U.P. Lko. And Another Counsel for Applicant :- Arun Kumar Shukla,Amit Kumar Mishra,Jay Mangal Sharma Counsel for Opposite Party :- G.A.,Nazia Khatoon

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Hon'ble Ajai Kumar Srivastava-I,J.

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1 . Heard Shri Arun Kumar Shukla, learned counsel for the applicants, Shri Rajesh Kumar Singh, learned A.G.A.-I for the State, Ms. Nazia Khatoon, learned counsel for opposite party No.2 and perused the entire record.

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2. This application under Section 482 Cr.P.C. has been filed by the applicants for quashing the impugned summoning order dated 23.02.2024 passed by the Court of Additional Civil Judge (Junior Division) 1st/ J.M. Ayodhya in Complaint No.1926 of 2024 under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C., Police Station Mahila Thana, District Ayodhya in the title of Kirti Yadav vs. Mahesh Yadav and others.

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3. From the perusal of the record it transpires that vide order dated 02.04.2024 passed by a coordinate Bench of this Court in Application U/S 482 No.3041 of 2024, the matter was referred to Mediation & Conciliation Centre of this Court to explore the possibility of amicable settlement between the parties. As per the mediation report, both the parties have entered into a settlement agreement dated 09.08.2024. The said settlement agreement has been signed by applicant No.1, Mahesh Yadav and opposite party No.2, Kirti Yadav along with their counsels. A copy of the said agreement is on record and annexed as Annexure No.D. As per the settlement agreement, the applicant No.1 and opposite party No.2 have amicably settled their dispute and buried the hatchet. In the aforesaid settlement agreement dated 09.08.2024, both the parties have agreed to withdraw all cases filed by them against each other.

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4. Learned counsel A.G.A. as well as learned counsel for opposite party No.2 have not disputed the fact that the parties have settled their dispute amicably through the process of mediation in the Mediation & Conciliation Centre of this Court

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by means of settlement agreement dated 09.08.2024. They have also not disputed the fact that the present dispute between the parties is an outcome of matrimonial dispute.

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5. Hon'ble Supreme Court in Parbatbhai Aahir @ Parbatbhai Bhimsinhbhai Karmur and Others Vs. State of Gujarat and another, (2017) 9 SCC 641 has laid down the following guidelines with regard to quashing of criminal proceedings as well regarding compromise in criminal proceedings in paragraphs 16 to 16.10 of the judgement, which is quoted below:

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"16. The broad principles which emerge from the precedents on the subject, may be summarised in the following propositions.

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16.1. Section 482 preserves the inherent powers of the High Court to prevent an abuse of the process of any court or to secure the ends of justice. The provision does not confer new powers. It only recognizes and preserves powers which inhere in the High Court;

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16.2. The invocation of the jurisdiction of the High Court to quash a First Information Report or a criminal proceeding on the ground that a settlement has been arrived at between the offender and the victim is not the same as the invocation of jurisdiction for the purpose of compounding an offence. While compounding an offence, the power of the court is governed by the provisions of Section 320 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. The power to quash under Section 482 is attracted even if the offence is noncompoundable.

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16.3. In forming an opinion whether a criminal proceeding or complaint should be quashed in exercise of its jurisdiction under Section 482, the High Court must evaluate whether the ends of justice would justify the exercise of the inherent power;

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16.4. While the inherent power of the High Court has a wide ambit and plenitude it has to be exercised; (i) to secure the ends of justice or (ii) to prevent an abuse of the process of any court;

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16.5. The decision as to whether a complaint or First Information Report should be quashed on the ground that the offender and victim have settled the dispute, revolves ultimately on the facts and circumstances of

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each case and no exhaustive elaboration of principles can be formulated;

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16.6. In the exercise of the power under Section 482 and while dealing with a plea that the dispute has been settled, the High Court must have due regard to the nature and gravity of the offence. Heinous and serious offences involving mental depravity or offences such as murder, rape and dacoity cannot appropriately be quashed though the victim or the family of the victim have settled the dispute. Such offences are, truly speaking, not private in nature but have a serious impact upon society. The decision to continue with the trial in such cases is founded on the overriding element of public interest in punishing persons for serious offences;

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16.7. As distinguished from serious offences, there may be criminal cases which have an overwhelming or predominant element of a civil dispute. They stand on a distinct footing in so far as the exercise of the inherent power to quash is concerned;

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16.8. Criminal cases involving offences which arise from commercial, financial, mercantile, partnership or similar transactions with an essentially civil flavour may in appropriate situations fall for quashing where parties have settled the dispute;

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16.9. In such a case, the High Court may quash the criminal proceeding if in view of the compromise between the disputants, the possibility of a conviction is remote and the continuation of a criminal proceeding would cause oppression and prejudice; and

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16.10. There is yet an exception to the principle set out in propositions 16.8 and 16.9 above. Economic offences involving the financial and economic well-being of the state have implications which lie beyond the domain of a mere dispute between private disputants. The High Court would be justified in declining to quash where the offender is involved in an activity akin to a financial or economic fraud or misdemeanour. The consequences of the act complained of upon the financial or economic system will weigh in the balance."

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6. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in Criminal Appeal No. 1489 of 2012 (Ramgopal and Another Vs. The State of M.P.),

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2021 SCC OnLine SC 834 , has reiterated the guidelines regarding quashing of criminal proceedings in view of compromise. Following has been observed in paragraph 18-19:-

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"18. It is now a well crystalized axiom that plenary jurisdiction of this Court to impart complete justice under Article 142 cannot ipso facto be limited or restricted by ordinary statutory provisions. It is also noteworthy that even in the absence of an express provision akin to Section 482 Cr.P.C. conferring powers on the Supreme Court to abrogate and set aside criminal proceedings, the jurisdiction exercisable under Article 142 of the Constitution embraces this Court with scopious powers to quash criminal proceedings also, so as to secure complete justice. In doing so, due regard must be given to the overarching objective of sentencing in the criminal justice system, which is grounded on the sub-lime philosophy of maintenance of peace of the collective and that the rationale of placing an individual behind bars is aimed at his reformation.

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19. We thus sum-up and hold that as opposed to Section 320 Cr.P.C. where the Court is squarely guided by the compromise between the parties in respect of offences 'compoundable' within the statutory framework, the extra-ordinary power enjoined upon a High Court under Section 482 Cr.P.C. or vested in this Court under Article 142 of the Constitution, can be invoked beyond the metes and bounds of Section 320 Cr.P.C. Nonetheless, we reiterate that such powers of wide amplitude ought to be exercise carefully in the context of quashing criminal proceedings, bearing in mind: (i) Nature and effect of the offence on the conscious of the society; (ii) Seriousness of the injury, if any; (iii) Voluntary nature of compromise between accused and the victim; & (iv) Conduct of the accused persons, prior to and after the occurrence of the purported offence and/or other relevant considerations."

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(Emphasis supplied)

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7. Considering the aforesaid facts and circumstances of the present case and upon the perusal of material on record, it

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appears that during pendency of the present application, parties have already settled their dispute voluntarily and amicably through the process of mediation by means of settlement agreement dated 09.08.2024 and a copy of the same is annexed as Annexure-D. The dispute between the parties is an outcome of matrimonial dispute which is an overwhelming element of a private dispute between the parties. As such, on date, no difference exists between parties. Consequently, this Court is of the considered opinion that no useful purpose shall be served by prolonging the proceedings of above mentioned cases. In view of said settlement agreement, chances of conviction of accused applicants are remote and bleak. Resultantly, continuation of proceedings would thus, itself cause injustice to parties.

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8. In view of above, present application succeeds and is liable to be allowed.

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9. Accordingly, the entire proceedings of Complaint No.1926 of 2024 under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C., Police Station Mahila Thana, District Ayodhya are, hereby, quashed.

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10. The instant application under Section 482 Cr.P.C. is allowed .

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11. Interim order, if any, stands discharged.

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12. OfÏce is directed to send a copy of this order to the Court concerned through email/fax immediately for necessary compliance.

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Order Date :- 28.11.2024 Mahesh

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Digitally signed by :- MAHESH KUMAR High Court of Judicature at Allahabad, Lucknow Bench

Mahesh Yadav and 4 Others v. State of U.P. Thru. Addl. Chief Secy. Home U.P. Lko. and Another

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Mahesh Yadav and 4 Others v. State of U.P. Thru. Addl. Chief Secy. Home U.P. Lko. and Another

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