Dismissed

U.P.S.R.T.C. and Others v. Manorama Pant and Others

Allahabad HC10 Jan 2023FAFO/617/1993

Case brief

AI extract

What is this about?

An appeal against the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal's order awarding compensation for a motor accident. The High Court jury found the appeal devoid of merits, dismissing the revision that parents were non-dependent and refusing to alter the compensation award.

What did the court decide?

The appeal is dismissed. The Tribunal will disburse the statutory amount to the legal heirs.

U.P.S.R.T.C. and Others Vs Manorama Pant and Others — Motor Accident Claims | Allahabad HC (2023)

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Court No. - 44

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Case :- FIRST APPEAL FROM ORDER No. - 617 of 1993

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Appellant :- U.P.S.R.T.C. And Others Respondent :- Manorama Pant And Others Counsel for Appellant :- S.K. Sharma,Rahul Anand Gaur,Samir Sharma Counsel for Respondent :- Ashok Mehta

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Hon'ble Dr. Kaushal Jayendra Thaker,J.

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1. By way of this appeal, the appellant has challenged the judgment and order dated 16.2.1993 passed by Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, VIIIth Additional District Judge, Saharanpur (hereinafter referred to as ‘Tribunal’) in M.A.C.P. No.166 of 1989 (Smt. Manorama Pant and Others Vs. U.P. State Road Transport Corporation and others) awarding sum of Rs.1,35,000/- as compensation to the claimants/respondent with interest at the rate of 9% per annum from the date of filing the claim petition.

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2. Heard learned counsel for the appellant. None appears for respondent.

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3. Brief facts of the case as culled out from the record are that deceased Atul Pant was going to Chutmalpur from Saharanpur on 23.9.1989 and he was pillion rider of scooter no. PCA 6897. At about 9:40 AM near village Hatoda, Police Station Gagalheri, a bus bearing no. UHJ 8946 belonging to UPSRTC, which was being driven very rashly and negligently by its drier and hit the scooter from behind and the deceased died instantaneously on the spot.

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4. The twin grounds raised by learned counsel for the appellant that deceased was a pillion rider on the scooter, was being driven very rashly and negligently by its driver and it was the driver of the scooter who had lost his balance and collided with the left rear side of the bus and said the cause of death of the pillion rider. In the alternative, it is

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submitted that driver of the scooter had contributed 90% to the accident have taken place. The next ground is that claim petition was bad for non-joinder of owner, driver and insurance of the scooter. It is also submitted that testimony of driver and the conductor was not considered by the court below in its entirety.

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5. It is further submitted that compensation awarded could not have been awarded as the claimants were not dependent on the deceased. The family dependency of 70 years and grant of Rs.1,35,000/- is bad. The tribunal should have deducted 33% and interest awarded is bad.

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6. The term negligence means failure to exercise care towards others which a reasonable and prudent person would in a circumstance or taking action which such a reasonable person would not. Negligence can be both intentional or accidental which is normally accidental. More particularly, it connotes reckless driving and the injured must always prove that the either side is negligent. If the injury rather death is caused by something owned or controlled by the negligent party then he is directly liable otherwise the principle of "res ipsa loquitur" meaning thereby "the things speak for itself" would apply.

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7. The principle of contributory negligence has been discussed time and again. A person who either contributes or author of the accident would be liable for his contribution to the accident having taken place.

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8. The Division Bench of this Court in First Appeal From Order No. 1818 of 2012 ( Bajaj Allianz General Insurance Co.Ltd. Vs. Smt. Renu Singh And Others) decided on 19.7.2016 has held as under:

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"16. Negligence means failure to exercise required degree of care

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and caution expected of a prudent driver. Negligence is the omission to do something which a reasonable man, guided upon the considerations, which ordinarily regulate conduct of human affairs, would do, or doing something which a prudent and reasonable man would not do. Negligence is not always a question of direct evidence. It is an inference to be drawn from proved facts. Negligence is not an absolute term, but is a relative one. It is rather a comparative term. What may be negligence in one case may not be so in another. Where there is no duty to exercise care, negligence in the popular sense has no legal consequence. Where there is a duty to exercise care, reasonable care must be taken to avoid acts or omissions which would be reasonably foreseen likely to caused physical injury to person. The degree of care required, of course, depends upon facts in each case. On these broad principles, the negligence of drivers is required to be assessed.

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17. It would be seen that burden of proof for contributory negligence on the part of deceased has to be discharged by the opponents. It is the duty of driver of the offending vehicle to explain the accident. It is well settled law that at intersection where two roads cross each other, it is the duty of a fast moving vehicle to slow down and if driver did not slow down at intersection, but continued to proceed at a high speed without caring to notice that another vehicle was crossing, then the conduct of driver necessarily leads to conclusion that vehicle was being driven by him rashly as well as negligently.

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18. 10th Schedule appended to Motor Vehicle Act contain statutory regulations for driving of motor vehicles which also form part of every Driving License. Clause-6 of such Regulation clearly directs that the driver of every motor vehicle to slow down vehicle at every intersection or junction of roads or at a turning of the road. It is also provided that driver of the vehicle should not enter intersection or junction of roads unless he makes sure that he would not thereby endanger any other person. Merely, because driver of the Truck was driving vehicle on the left side of road would not absolve him from his responsibility to slow down vehicle as he approaches intersection of roads, particularly when he could have easily seen, that the car over which deceased was riding, was approaching intersection.

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19. In view of the fast and constantly increasing volume of traffic, motor vehicles upon roads may be regarded to some extent as coming within the principle of liability defined in Rylands V/s. Fletcher, (1868) 3 HL (LR) 330. From the point of view of pedestrian, the roads of this country have been rendered by the use of motor vehicles, highly dangerous. 'Hit and run' cases where

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drivers of motor vehicles who have caused accidents, are unknown. In fact such cases are increasing in number. Where a pedestrian without negligence on his part is injured or killed by a motorist, whether negligently or not, he or his legal representatives, as the case may be, should be entitled to recover damages if principle of social justice should have any meaning at all.

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20. These provisions (sec.110A and sec.110B of Motor Act, 1988) are not merely procedural provisions. They substantively affect the rights of the parties. The right of action created by Fatal Accidents Act, 1855 was 'new in its species, new in its quality, new in its principles. In every way it was new. The right given to legal representatives under Act, 1988 to file an application for compensation for death due to a motor vehicle accident is an enlarged one. This right cannot be hedged in by limitations of an action under Fatal Accidents Act, 1855. New situations and new dangers require new strategies and new remedies.

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21. In the light of the above discussion, we are of the view that even if courts may not by interpretation displace the principles of law which are considered to be well settled and, therefore, court cannot dispense with proof of negligence altogether in all cases of motor vehicle accidents, it is possible to develop the law further on the following lines; when a motor vehicle is being driven with reasonable care, it would ordinarily not meet with an accident and, therefore, rule of res-ipsa loquitor as a rule of evidence may be invoked in motor accident cases with greater frequency than in ordinary civil suits (per three-Judge Bench in Jacob Mathew V/s. State of Punjab, 2005 0 ACJ(SC) 1840).

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22. By the above process, the burden of proof may ordinarily be cast on the defendants in a motor accident claim petition to prove that motor vehicle was being driven with reasonable care or that there is equal negligence on the part the other side."

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9. The Apex Court in Khenyei Vs. New India Assurance Company Limited & Others, 2015 LawSuit (SC) 469 has held as under:

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"4. It is a case of composite negligence where injuries have been caused to the claimants by combined wrongful act of joint tort feasors. In a case of accident caused by negligence of joint tort feasors, all the persons who aid or counsel or direct or join in committal of a wrongful act, are liable. In such case, the liability is always joint and several. The extent of negligence of joint tort feasors in such a case is immaterial for satisfaction of the claim of the plaintiff/claimant and need not be determined by the by the

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court. However, in case all the joint tort feasors are before the court, it may determine the extent of their liability for the purpose of adjusting inter-se equities between them at appropriate stage. The liability of each and every joint tort feasor vis a vis to plaintiff/claimant cannot be bifurcated as it is joint and several liability. In the case of composite negligence, apportionment of compensation between tort feasors for making payment to the plaintiff is not permissible as the plaintiff/claimant has the right to recover the entire amount from the easiest targets/solvent defendant.”

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10. While considering the facts of this case, the learned Tribunal has elaborately dealt with the evidence on record and comes to the conclusion that the driver of the bus was the sole perpetrator of the tot.

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11. In that view of the matter, issue relates to negligence is decided against the appellant. This Court takes to the next issue whether the amount could have been awarded to the parents, who are not dependent. The provisions of Section 166 of Motor Vehicles Act, no were stipulated the legal heirs or legal representatives should be dependent. The only word uses that the legal representatives and parents are legal representatives, therefore, this ground fails.

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12. The rate of interest in the year 1993 was 12% as granted in many of the matters, the Tribunal has considered 9% only. While considering the compensation awarded it goes without saying that Tribunal has not considered the future loss of income and granted the multiplier of 15 as the deceased was in the age group of 25 to 30 but as none appear, this Court does not disturb the compensation. The compensation awarded cannot be said to be on the higher side.

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13. In view of the above, the appeal is devoid of merits and is dismissed.

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14. Interim relief, if any, stands vacated forthwith. The statutory amount be transmitted to the court below, which shall immediately

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disburse all the amount to the legal heirs or legal representatives, if yet not disbursed.

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15. The amount already deposited be deducted from the amount to be deposited. Record and proceedings be sent back to the Tribunal forthwith.

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Order Date :- 10.1.2023 P.S.Parihar

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