Bail application rejected for an accused charged with cheating, forgery, and arms act violations. The court found the applicant's license invalid by 2015, his subsequent Delhi license obtained improperly, and serious misuse of shooter status to acquire prohibited arms and ammunition.
This page shows the compact analysis of this judgement. The full analysis — procedural history, issue-by-issue holdings with ratio and obiter, advocates, and paragraph-level evidence for every claim — is being added to the record in batches and will appear here when this judgement has been through it.
Neutral Citation No. - 2023:AHC-LKO:76225
AFR
Court No. - 16
Case :- CRIMINAL MISC. BAIL APPLICATION No. - 3121 of 2023 Applicant :- Abbas Ansari Opposite Party :- State Of U.P. Thru. Prin. Secy. Home Lko. Counsel for Applicant :- Pranjal Krishna,Arun Sinha,Siddhartha Sinha Counsel for Opposite Party :- G.A.
Hon’ble Subhash Vidyarthi J.
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bail application, it has been stated that the applicant has a criminal history of eight cases but particulars of those cases has not been disclosed by the applicant in the affidavit.
| Sl.No. | Case Crime No. |
Section | P.S. | District |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | 689 / 20 | 120 B, 420, 323, 356, 467, 468, 471, 474, 477 A IPC |
Kotwali, Ghazipur |
Ghazipur |
| 2 | 236 / 20 | 120 B, 420, 467, 468, 471 IPC and Prevention of Damage To Public Property Act |
Hazaratganj | Lucknow |
| 3 | 431 / 19 | 419, 420, 467, 468, 471 IPC and Section 30 Arms Act |
Mahanagar | Lucknow |
| 4 | 27 / 22 | 188, 171 H IPC and Section 133 of Representation of People Act |
T. Tola | Mau |
| 5 | 95 / 22 | 188, 171 F IPC | Kotwali | Mau |
| 6 | 97 / 22 | 171 H, 506, 186, 189, 153 A, 120 B, IPC |
Kotwali | Mau |
| 7 | 106 / 22 | 171 H, 188, 341 IPC | Kotwali | Mau |
| 8 | 312 / 22 | 174 A IPC | Kotwali Mahanagar |
Lucknow |
| 9 | 0088 / 23 | 387, 222, 186, 506, 201, 120 B, 195 A, 34 IPC & 34, 7, 8, 13 P.C. Act |
Kotwali Nagar Karvi |
Chitrakut |
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filed an Application u/s 482 Cr.P.C No. 1905 of 2022 challenging validity of the charge-sheet. The aforesaid application is pending consideration of this court and no interim relief has been granted to the applicant in that case.
2. Whether one state, more than one states (specify the states) or All India (copy of Area Validity extension order may also be enclosed).
3. Date of the sanction of the licence.
4. Details of the weapon entitled according to the arms license.
5. Quota cartridges entitlement.
6. Last renewal and its validity.
7. A copy of local police verification conducted at the time of issues of Arms Licence & copy of residence proof submitted by above license, may also be provided to this office. This may kindly be treated as URGENT.”
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license, which are mentioned on the license. The license mentions the areas of its validity to be all India being a renowned shooter and it was valid till 24.09.2018. The cartridges purchased on the strength of the arms license have also been mentioned on the license, which indicates that the applicant had made several purchases of cartridges of a gun, rifle and pistol of different bores at several instances. He had often purchased 200 cartridges at once on several instances and at one instance he had purchased 1000 cartridges of 1.22 bore. Numerous other instances of purchase of cartridges have been endorsed on the license issued to the applicant.
“i) Rifles in caliber .22 Long (1) The total number of weapon Rife (also known as .22 L.R);
(ii) Center fire Rifles with calibers up to 8 mm including all calibers lower than 8mm;
(iii) Pistol/ Revolvers of caliber up to and including 9 mm (2) The person must hold a certificate but excluding o mm parabellum (9x19mm)
(iv) Short guns of caliber up to 12 bore/gauge including all calibers lower than 12 bore/gauge.”
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the number, for which he had been licensed and the firearms had been recovered from the applicant’s residence at New Delhi. The offence, if any, has been committed by the applicant at New Delhi, and, therefore, U.P. Police had no authority to lodge a First Information Report in police Station Mahanagar, as no offence has been committed by the applicant within the territorial limits of the aforesaid Police Station or even in the territory of the State of Uttar Pradesh. 15. In the order dated 19.10.2019 passed by a Division Bench of this court in Writ Petition No. 28833 (M/B) of 2019, this Court had directed that while filing a counter affidavit, the State should address the point that after a license had been issued by the Delhi Police whether the District Magistrate, Lucknow remained the licensing authority after having given a No Objection letter.
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Dr. Shivinder Mohan Singh versus Directorate of Enforcement , 2020 SCC OnLine Del 766, Moti Ram versus State of M.P. , (1978) 4 SCC 47, Babu Singh versus State of U.P. , (1978) 1 SCC 579, Ash Mohammad versus Shiv Raj Singh alias Lalla Babu and another , (2012) 9 SCC 446, Chaman Lal versus State of U.P. and another , (2004) 7 SCC 525, Masroor versus State of U.P. and another , (2009) 14 SCC 286, P. Chidambaram versus CBI , (2020) 13 SCC 337, P. Chidambaram versus Directorate of Enforcement , (2020) 13 SCC 791, Prasanta Kumar Sarkar versus Ashis Chatterjee and another , (2010) 14 SCC 496, Ram Govind Upadhyay versus Sudarshan Singh and another , (2002) 3 SCC 598 and Sanjay Chandra versus CBI , (2012) 1 SCC 40. However, he placed before the Court only one judgment in the case of Dr. Shivinder Mohan Singh versus Directorate of Enforcement , 2020 SCC OnLine Del 766 and left the other judgments to be read by the Court itself.
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Hon’ble Court which has not been quashed by the Hon’ble High Court so far. Therefore, any contention regarding it being irrelevant or extra jurisdictional or frivolous cannot be considered at this stage.
2. Perusal of record revealed that the licensee applied to this Licensing Authority on 14.10.2015 seeking addition of an NPB Rifle on the grounds of being “Renowned Shot and for which recommendation of NRAI and copy of import permit no. NRAI/IMPP/861/1785/2015 dated 02.09.2015 was issued by the NRAI. The then Licensing Authority accordingly allowed addition of 01 Rifle with spare Barrel on the basis of these documents. However, licensee preferred not to avail import permit and rather availed the provisions of notification no. 147/94-Customs for bringing 06 spare Barrels in personal baggage.
Further, perusal of the import permit revealed that a clear description of Bore, Barrel, number of Rifles as ‘one’ and number of spare barrels as ‘one’ permitted to be imported was mentioned in the import permit. Had the licensee used the said import permit he would have not been allowed to import weapons or barrels of other description and excess in quantity which he actually did. He rather exploited the conditions of the Ministry of Home Affairs Notification No. S.O 665(E), dated 04.08.2014 which clarifies that “for exemptees at SI No. 1 and Sl. No. 2 of the schedule, a weapon with spare or conversion Barrels is to be treated as one weapon only at the time of endorsement of the license and full details of the said weapon and such spare and conversion weapon shall be endorsed on the respective license”. The act of the licensee is suggestive of his intention to bring the Barrels of different Bores from overseas for some other purposes and reasons best known to him, other than sports as Barrels of caliber (1) .375 (9.52 mm) Bore No. R/ 101633 and (2) .458 (11.63 mm) Bore No. R/109355 are not permissible to shooters as per the then existing Ministry of Home Affairs Notification No. S.O. 1988 (E), dated 04/08/2014.
Perusal of record also revealed that on 06.04.2016, the licensee had applied for conversion of his NPB Gun to NPB Revolver/Pistol citing reason of being a renowned shot who wanted to participate in ‘small bore’ weapon events. His request was acceded to. He imported one .357 (9.067 mm) Bore Pistol No. BBGV-728 alongwith 03 spare Barrels and out of which .40 (10.16 mm) Bore No. BBCD-839 was not permissible to sports person as per the then existing Ministry of Home Affairs Notification No. S.O 1988 (E), dated 04.08.2014 which again
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casts aspersions on the intention of the licensee to use said weapon for some other purpose and reasons best known to him.”
“1. 12 Bore SBBL Gun No. TA-013638 Import from Policane. Slovenija .
2. 0.357 Bore Pistol No. BBGV-728 Import form Policane. Slovenija.
3. 0.30-06 Bore Rifle No. R/105923 with 06 Barrels (1) Cal. .223 Sl. No. R/111317 (2)Cal. .308 Sl. No. R/111048 (3) Cal. .30-06 Sl. No. R/101847 (4) Cal. 300 Sl. No. R/105251 (5) Cal. .375 Sl. No. R/101633 (6) Cal. .458 Sl. No. R/10355 Imported from Policane, Slovenija J
4. 12 Bore DBBL Sl. No. 03297W Beretta Import from Cyprus. ”
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appreciate the facts of the case; the nature of allegations; gravity of offence and the role attributed to the Accused.
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in fact such a petition was dismissed earlier not very long ago. The consideration of the period of one year spent in jail cannot in our view be a relevant consideration in the matter of grant of bail, more so by reason of the fact that the offence charged is that of murder under Section 302 IPC having the punishment of death or life imprisonment — it is a heinous crime against the society and as such the court ought to be rather circumspect and cautious in its approach in a matter which stands out to be a social crime of a very serious nature.”
“3. Grant of bail though being a discretionary order — but, however, calls for exercise of such a discretion in a judicious manner and not as a matter of course. Order for bail bereft of any cogent reason cannot be sustained. Needless to record, however, that the grant of bail is dependent upon the contextual facts of the matter being dealt with by the court and facts, however, do always vary from case to case. While placement of the accused in the society, though may be considered but that by itself cannot be a guiding factor in the matter of grant of bail and the same should and ought always to be coupled with other circumstances warranting the grant of bail. The nature of the offence is one of the basic considerations for the grant of bail — more heinous is the crime, the greater is the chance of rejection of the bail, though, however, dependent on the factual matrix of the matter.
4. Apart from the above, certain other which may be attributed to be relevant considerations may also be noticed at this juncture, though however, the same are only illustrative and not exhaustive, neither there can be any. The considerations being:
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The aforesaid judgment has no relevance for deciding the applicant’s
bail application.
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been issued for his production premised on the requirement that there is an obligation to arrest the accused and produce him before the court. We are of the view that if the investigating officer does not believe that the accused will abscond or disobey summons he/she is not required to be produced in custody. The word “custody” appearing in Section 170 CrPC does not contemplate either police or judicial custody but it merely connotes the presentation of the accused by the investigating officer before the court while filing the charge-sheet.
10. We may note that personal liberty is an important aspect of our constitutional mandate. The occasion to arrest an accused during investigation arises when custodial investigation becomes necessary or it is a heinous crime or where there is a possibility of influencing the witnesses or accused may abscond. Merely because an arrest can be made because it is lawful does not mandate that arrest must be made. A distinction must be made between the existence of the power to arrest and the justification for exercise of it [Joginder Kumar v. State of U.P., (1994) 4 SCC 260 : 1994 SCC (Cri) 1172]. If arrest is made routine, it can cause incalculable harm to the reputation and self-esteem of a person. If the investigating officer has no reason to believe that the accused will abscond or disobey summons and has, in fact, throughout cooperated with the investigation we fail to appreciate why there should be a compulsion on the officer to arrest the accused.
11. We are, in fact, faced with a situation where contrary to the observations in Joginder Kumar case how a police officer has to deal with a scenario of arrest, the trial courts are stated to be insisting on the arrest of an accused as a prerequisite formality to take the charge-sheet on record in view of the provisions of Section 170 CrPC. We consider such a course misplaced and contrary to the very intent of Section 170 CrPC.”
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of justice. It is not only traditional but rational, in this context, to enquire into the antecedents of a man who is applying for bail to find whether he has a bad record—particularly a record which suggests that he is likely to commit serious offences while on bail. In regard to habituals, it is part of criminological history that a thoughtless bail order has enabled the bailee to exploit the opportunity to inflict further crimes on the members of society. Bail discretion, on the basis of evidence about the criminal record of a defendant, is therefore not an exercise in irrelevance.
* * *
19. A few other weighty factors deserve reference. All deprivation of liberty is validated by social defense and individual correction along an anti-criminal direction. Public justice is central to the whole scheme of bail law. Fleeing justice must be forbidden but punitive harshness should be minimised. Restorative devices to redeem the man, even through community service, meditative drill, study classes or other resources should be innovated, and playing foul with public peace by tampering with evidence, intimidating witnesses or committing offences while on judicially sanctioned “free enterprise”, should be provided against. No seeker of justice shall play confidence tricks on the Court or community. Thus, conditions may be hung around bail orders, not to cripple but to protect. Such is the holistic jurisdiction and humanistic orientation invoked by the judicial discretion correlated to the values of our Constitution.
20. Viewed from this perspective, we gain a better insight into the rules of the game. When a person, charged with a grave offence, has been acquitted at a stage, has the intermediate acquittal pertinence to a bail plea when the appeal before this Court pends? Yes, it has. The panic which might prompt the accused to jump the gauntlet of justice is less, having enjoyed the confidence of the Court’s verdict once. Concurrent holdings of guilt have the opposite effect. Again, the ground for denial of provisional release becomes weaker when the fact stares us in the face that a fair finding — if that be so — of innocence has been recorded by one Court. It may be conclusive, for the judgment of acquittal may be ex facie wrong, the likelihood of desperate reprisal, it enlarged, may be a deterrent and his own safety may be more in prison than in the vengeful village where feuds have provoked the violent offence. It depends. Antecedents of the man and socio-geographical circumstances have a bearing only from this angle. Police exaggerations of prospective misconduct of the accused, if enlarged, must be soberly sized up lest danger of excesses and injustice creep subtly into the discretionary curial technique. Bad record and police prediction of criminal prospects to invalidate the bail plea are admissible in
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principle but shall not stampede the Court into a complacent refusal.”
“24. Nowhere is it the law that an accused, yet to be tried, is to be kept in custody only on a hunch or a presumption that he will prejudice or impede trial; or to send any message to the society. If anything, the only message that goes-out to the society by keeping an accused in prison before finding him guilty, is that our system works only on impressions and conjectures and can keep an accused in custody even on presumption of guilt. While in certain cases such message may even quench the thirst for revenge of the lay society against a person they believe to be guilty, such action would certainly not leave our criminal justice system awash in glory. An investigating agency must come to court with the confidence that they have arrested an accused, based on credible material, and have filed a complaint or a charge-sheet with the certainty that they will be able to bring home guilt, by satisfying a court beyond reasonable doubt. But when an investigating agency suggests that an accused be detained in custody as an undertrial for a prolonged period, even after the complaint or charge-sheet has been filed, it appears that the investigating agency is not convinced of its case and so it fears that the accused may ‘get-off’ by discharge or acquittal; and that therefore the only way to ‘punish the accused’ is to let him remain in custody as an undertrial.
25. After all, the Supreme Court has said that it would be improper for any court to refuse bail as a mark of disapproval of former conduct whether the accused has been convicted for it or not or to refuse bail to an unconvicted person for the purpose of giving him a taste of imprisonment as a lesson (cf. Sanjay Chandra v. CBI, supra). How does one carry forward the Supreme Court precept that punishment begins after conviction, and that every man is deemed to be innocent until duly tried and duly found guilty, if we deny bail without cogent reason (cf. Sanjay Chandra v. CBI, supra).
26. People’s trust in the criminal justice system must rest on surer footing than on pre-trial punishment by keeping accused persons in prison. Statistics available on the Delhi Prisons website as on 31.12.2019 show that the proportion of undertrials to convicts in Delhi prisons is about 82 percent to 18 per cent. These numbers are telling. Prison is a place for punishment; and no punishment can be legitimate without a trial. There must be
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compelling basis, grounds and reasons to detain an undertrial in judicial custody, which this court does not discern in the present case.”
40. The aforesaid judgment has been rendered by an Hon’ble Single Judge of another High Court and it has no binding precedential value, and there was no occasion to place this judgment when there are numerous judgments of the Hon’ble Supreme Court on the points in issue.
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22. From the earliest times, it was appreciated that detention in custody pending completion of trial could be a cause of great hardship. From time to time, necessity demands that some unconvicted persons should be held in custody pending trial to secure their attendance at the trial but in such cases, “necessity” is the operative test. In this country, it would be quite contrary to the concept of personal liberty enshrined in the Constitution that any person should be punished in respect of any matter, upon which, he has not been convicted or that in any circumstances, he should be deprived of his liberty upon only the belief that he will tamper with the witnesses if left at liberty, save in the most extraordinary circumstances.
23. Apart from the question of prevention being the object of refusal of bail, one must not lose sight of the fact that any imprisonment before conviction has a substantial punitive content and it would be improper for any court to refuse bail as a mark of disapproval of former conduct whether the accused has been convicted for it or not or to refuse bail to an unconvicted person for the purpose of giving him a taste of imprisonment as a lesson.”
43. However, in Sanjay Chandra (Supra) the Hon’ble Supreme Court further held that “ The grant or refusal to grant bail lies within the discretion of the court. The grant or denial is regulated, to a large extent, by the facts and circumstances of each particular case .”
5. The historical background of the provision for bail has been elaborately and lucidly explained in a recent decision delivered in Nikesh Tarachand Shah v. Union of India going back to the days of the Magna Carta. In that decision, reference was made to Gurbaksh Singh Sibbia v. State of Punjab in which it is observed that it was held way back in Nagendra Nath Chakravarti, In re that bail is not to be withheld as a
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punishment. Reference was also made to Emperor v. H.L. Hutchinson wherein it was observed that grant of bail is the rule and refusal is the exception. The provision for bail is therefore age-old and the liberal interpretation to the provision for bail is almost a century old, going back to colonial days.”
“21. The jurisdiction to grant bail has to be exercised on the basis of the well-settled principles having regard to the facts and circumstances of each case. The following factors are to be taken into consideration while considering an application for bail:
22. There is no hard-and-fast rule regarding grant or refusal to grant bail. Each case has to be considered on the facts and circumstances of each case and on its own merits. The discretion of the court has to be exercised judiciously and not in an arbitrary manner .”
(Emphasis sullied)
47. In P. Chidambaram v. Directorate of Enforcement , (2020) 13 SCC 791, the Hon’ble Supreme Court explained the principles for considering the claim of release on bail regarding persons accused of economic offences and held that: -
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“23. … the basic jurisprudence relating to bail remains the same inasmuch as the grant of bail is the rule and refusal is the exception so as to ensure that the accused has the opportunity of securing fair trial. However, while considering the same the gravity of the offence is an aspect which is required to be kept in view by the Court. The gravity for the said purpose will have to be gathered from the facts and circumstances arising in each case. Keeping in view the consequences that would befall on the society in cases of financial irregularities, it has been held that even economic offences would fall under the category of “grave offence” and in such circumstance while considering the application for bail in such matters, the Court will have to deal with the same, being sensitive to the nature of allegation made against the accused. One of the circumstances to consider the gravity of the offence is also the term of sentence that is prescribed for the offence the accused is alleged to have committed. Such consideration with regard to the gravity of offence is a factor which is in addition to the triple test or the tripod test that would be normally applied. In that regard what is also to be kept in perspective is that even if the allegation is one of grave economic offence, it is not a rule that bail should be denied in every case since there is no such bar created in the relevant enactment passed by the legislature nor does the bail jurisprudence provide so. Therefore, the underlining conclusion is that irrespective of the nature and gravity of charge, the precedent of another case alone will not be the basis for either grant or refusal of bail though it may have a bearing on principle. But ultimately the consideration will have to be on case-to-case basis on the facts involved therein and securing the presence of the accused to stand trial.
49. The offences allegedly committed by the applicant are punishable with imprisonment upto life and his case falls under category B, regarding which the guideline laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme
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Court is that ‘ On appearance of the accused in court pursuant to process issued bail application to be decided on merits.’
“29. … There cannot be an inexorable formula in the matter of granting bail. The facts and circumstances of each case will govern the exercise of judicial discretion in granting or cancelling bail .”
The Hon’ble Supreme Court further held that: -
“The jurisdiction to grant bail has to be exercised on the basis of well settled principles having regard to the circumstances of each case and not in an arbitrary manner. While granting the bail, the court has to keep in mind the nature of accusations, the nature of evidence in support thereof, the severity of the punishment which conviction will entail, the character, behavior, means and standing of the accused, circumstances which are peculiar to the accused, reasonable possibility of securing the presence of the accused at the trial, reasonable apprehension of the witnesses being tampered with, the larger interests of the public or State and similar other considerations. It has also to be kept in mind that for the purposes of granting the bail the Legislature has used the words “reasonable grounds for believing” instead of “the evidence” which means the court dealing with the grant of bail can only satisfy it as to whether there is a genuine case against the accused and that the prosecution will be able to produce prima facie evidence in support of the charge .”
(Emphasis supplied)
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by the District Magistrate Lucknow authorising him to hold a single DBBL gun. The license did not bear any UID number.
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proceeding have been made. However, for the purpose of the present application, it would be sufficient that the chain of acts allegedly committed by the applicant was initiated by the License granted to the applicant by the District Magistrate Lucknow authorising him to hold a single DBBL gun, in furtherance whereof the applicant got another license issued at New Delhi after obtaining a no-objection from the office of the District Magistrate Lucknow. It has come to light during investigation that the applicant’s claim of a permanent residence at New Delhi is false and he is a merely casual visitor of the premises taken on rent at New Delhi.
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case of his release on bail, I am of the considered view that the aforesaid facts disentitle the applicant to receive discretion of this Court by enlarging him on bail.
(Subhash Vidyarthi J.)
Order Date - 20.11.2023 Preeti.
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Digitally signed by :- PREETI GAUTAM High Court of Judicature at Allahabad, Lucknow Bench
1 issue framed by the court
Whether the applicant should be granted bail in a case involving cheating, forgery, and arms act violations, given his criminal history and the nature of allegations.
Colour shows how this judgement treated each authority
Satender Kumar Antil versus CBIReferred¶48
Satender Kumar Antil versus CBI, (2022) 10 SCC 51 · Who else cites this
Siddharth versus State of U.P. and anotherReferred¶36
Siddharth versus State of U.P. and another, (2022) 1 SCC 676 · Who else cites this
Dr. Shivinder Mohan Singh versus Directorate of EnforcementReferred¶39
Dr. Shivinder Mohan Singh versus Directorate of Enforcement, 2020 SCC OnLine Del 766 · Who else cites this
Moti Ram versus State of M.P.Referred¶35
Moti Ram versus State of M.P., (1978) 4 SCC 47 · Who else cites this
Babu Singh versus State of U.P.Referred¶38
Babu Singh versus State of U.P., (1978) 1 SCC 579 · Who else cites this
Ram Govind Upadhyay versus Sudarshan Singh and anotherReferred¶32
Ram Govind Upadhyay versus Sudarshan Singh and another, (2002) 3 SCC 598 · Who else cites this
Chaman Lal versus State of U.P. and anotherReferred¶34
Chaman Lal versus State of U.P. and another, (2004) 7 SCC 525 · Who else cites this
Masroor versus State of U.P. and anotherReferred¶34
Masroor versus State of U.P. and another, (2009) 14 SCC 286 · Who else cites this
Prasanta Kumar Sarkar versus Ashis Chatterjee and anotherReferred¶34
Prasanta Kumar Sarkar versus Ashis Chatterjee and another, (2010) 14 SCC 496 · Who else cites this
Ash Mohammad versus Shiv Raj Singh alias Lalla Babu and anotherReferred¶34
Ash Mohammad versus Shiv Raj Singh alias Lalla Babu and another, (2012) 9 SCC 446 · Who else cites this
P. Chidambaram versus CBIReferred¶46
P. Chidambaram versus CBI, (2020) 13 SCC 337 · Who else cites this
P. Chidambaram versus Directorate of EnforcementReferred¶47
P. Chidambaram versus Directorate of Enforcement, (2020) 13 SCC 791 · Who else cites this
Sanjay Chandra versus CBIReferred¶41
Sanjay Chandra versus CBI, (2012) 1 SCC 40 · Who else cites this
Harjeet Singh Vs. Indrapeet Singh and othersReferred¶28
Harjeet Singh Vs. Indrapeet Singh and others : AIR 2021 SC 4017 · Who else cites this
Gurcharan Singh v. State (Delhi Admn.)Referred¶50
Gurcharan Singh v. State (Delhi Admn.), (1978) 1 SCC 118 · Who else cites this
Ishwarji Nagaji MaliReferred¶51
Ishwarji Nagaji Mali (2022) 6 SCC 609 · Who else cites this
2 provisions across 2 enactments
Abbas Ansari
State Of U.P. Thru. Prin. Secy. Home Lko.
Subhash Vidyarthi
As recorded by the court registry
Judgements on the same questions, provisions and authorities, from every court
