Notwithstanding the above, the Court notes that the provisions of Regulation 88 do not lay down any special procedure which may mandate exclusion of the provisions made in Section 5 and 14 of the Limitation Act 1963. The Court bears in mind that the provision of appeal is a salutary remedy which is made available to an employee aggrieved by an order of punishment that may be imposed upon him. It is not disputed before this Court that against the order of punishment, an appeal was in fact preferred before the Administrator on 05 March 2019. The Administrator was not the competent authority and therefore it is manifest that the appeal had been instituted before an incompetent authority. It is in that context that the provisions of Section 14 of the Limitation Act 1963 assume relevance. Additionally and in the absence of a special period of limitation prescribed under Regulation 88, it cannot be said that provisions of Section 5 of the Limitation Act 1963 stand excluded by implication. In view of the aforesaid, the ends of justice would merit the impugned order being set aside and the petitioner being permitted to institute the appeal afresh before the second respondent.