Allowed

Meera Devi v. State of U.P. and Others

Allahabad HC18 Oct 2019WRIA/36222/2005

Case brief

AI extract

What is this about?

The High Court allowed a writ petition seeking compassionate appointment as an adopted daughter of a deceased assistant teacher. The Court followed a coordinate bench judgment to set aside an order rejecting the claim due to lack of registration, directing authorities to pass a fresh order considering the adopted child as a legal heir.

What did the court decide?

The impugned order dated 19.03.2005 was set aside. A mandamus was issued to the respondent to pass a fresh order within four months.

Meera Devi Vs State of U.P. and Others — Pension and Retirement Benefits | Allahabad HC (2019)

¶1

Court No. - 81

¶2

Case :- WRIT - A No. - 36222 of 2005

¶3

Petitioner : - Meera Devi Respondent : - State Of U.P. And Others Counsel for Petitioner : - P.K. Dwivedi Counsel for Respondent :- C.S.C.

¶4

Hon'ble Prakash Padia,J.

¶5

Heard Sri P. K. Dwivedi, learned counsel for the petitioner.

¶6

No body appears on behalf of the respondents even in the revised list.

¶7

Petitioner has preferred the present writ petition challenging the order dated 19.03.2005, passed by District Basic Education Officer, Ballia/respondent no.3., a copy thereof is appended as Annexure No.1 to the writ petition. The facts contained in the writ petition are that late Samraji Devi was working on the post of assistant teacher in Girls Junior High School, Sagarpali, district Ballia. She died on 20.10.2001 during her service period. It is further contended that the petitioner is adopted daughter of late Samraji Devi. Counsel for the petitioner has relied upon extract of Kutumb Register in order to show that the petitioner is the adopted daughter of the deceased. In paragraph 4 of the writ petition, it is stated that deceased Samraji Devi got the petitioner in adoption for which the real mother and father of the petitioner were ready and had given the petitioner to Late Samraji Devi through adoption deed according to the Hindu Adoptions & Maintenance Act, 1956. It is further stated that Late Samraji Devi had only one daughter, namely, the present petitioner-Meera Devi, hence in the service record the name of the petitioner is also incorporated as her legal heir.

¶8

It is contended that after the death of Late Samraji Devi, petitioner moved a representation before concerned competent authority for appointment on the post of assistant teacher on compassionate ground. Since no action was taken on the representation submitted by the petitioner, she preferred the present writ petition.

¶9

Counsel for the petitioner submitted that the petitioner moved several representations and contacted the authorities personally but no heed was paid. Lastly petitioner filed a writ petition No.5162 of 2004, (Meera Devi Vs. State of U.P. and others). The aforesaid writ petition was finally decided by the coordinate Bench of this Court vide judgment and order dated 06.12.2004. A copy of the order dated 06.12.2004 is produced

¶10

before this Court for perusal.

¶11

Pursuant to the aforesaid decision of this Court, an order has been passed by the respondent no.4/District Basic Education Officer, Ballia rejecting the claim of the petitioner for her appointment on the ground that auction deed submitted by the petitioner was not registered.

¶12

The petitioner has challenged the aforesaid order by filing the present writ petition. Apart from other various arguments raised by the learned counsel for the petitioner, he relied upon a coordinate Bench judgement of this Court passed in the case of Tarun Kumar Vs. State of U.P. and others, reported in 2011 (10) ADJ page 445 . He relied upon paragraphs 13 to 18 of the aforesaid judgment, which are reproduced hereinbelow:

¶13

"13. It is well settled law that the technicalities cannot and shall not stand while doing substantial justice to the party. The technicality could be removed either by the applicant suo motu or after requirement by the respondents. Here in this case, I do not find any material on record from which it cannot be inferred that the respondent has ever shown the reason for non consideration of the petitioner's application for not supplying the details along with the application. Therefore, at this stage it is too late to say and something unbelievable that the respondents have not considered the case because of shortcomings in the application. In this back drop, I am of the view that even if there was some shortcomings in the application, it was incumbent upon the department to require those details from the applicant instead of sitting tight over the matter without disclosing the same to the applicant or rejecting the application for this reason. Point no.2 is also answered in negative. Point No.3:-

¶14

14.So far as the third point is with regard to non consideration of the petitioner's case for the reason that the petitioner's is a adopted son and he will not fall under the definition of dependent as contemplated in Rule 2 of the Rules of 1974 is concerned, suffice it to say that this controversy is no more res integra and this court in the case of Jagat Pal Vs. State of U.P. and others reported in 2011 (2) ADJ 511 considering this type of problem held that the adopted son as well as the natural son shall be put at par. For appreciations few paragraphs of the aforesaid judgment are reproduce below:

¶15

17. In so far as the lis involved in this case with regard to equivalence of adopted son with natural son ( aurasa ) under the Rules of 1974 is concerned, it has tobe looked into in the context of the word 'family' as defined under Rule 2 (c) of the Rules of 1974 which runs as under.

¶16

(i) Wife or husband

¶17

(ii) Sons

¶18

(iii) Unmarried and widowed daughters.

¶19

(iv) If the deceased was unmarried government servant, brother

¶20

unmarried sister and widowed mother dependent on the deceased government servant.

¶21

From the perusal of Rule 2 (c) (ii) and 2 (c) (iii) of the Rules of 1974 it transpires that the word 'sons' and 'unmarried and widowed daughters' have been mentioned whereas in Clause (iv) the word 'brother' and 'unmarried sister' has been mentioned. Here, in Sub-Rule 2 (c) (ii) and 2 (c) (iii) plurality is attached with the word 'son' and 'daughter' whereas with respect to Sub-Rule 2 (c) (iv) it is in singular form by mentioning (brother and sister) and not 'brothers' and 'sisters'.

¶22

18. The problem which is wriggling in my mind is that why the framer of the Rules of 1974, in Rule 2 (c) (ii) and (iii) has attached plurality with the word 'son' and 'daughter' as 'sons' and 'daughters' and why singularity is attached with the word 'brother' and 'sister' in Rule 2 (c) (iv), whereas either it is son, daughter, brother or sister they constitute one class and in each category their number may be more than one, therefore, in view of Rule 5 which provides that only one member of the family is entitled to be considered for appointment, attaching plurality with the word 'son' and 'daughter', the framer of the rule has intended to mean something more behind the attachment of plurality with the word 'son' and 'daughter' and that looking into the object of the rule in recent perspective is to attach plurality means not to infer number of the 'son' and 'daughter' but the kind of the 'son' and 'daughter' who are legally recognized under law, as after the enactment of the Act of 1956 the kind of 'son' and 'daughter' has become more than one i.e. natural/real/son/daughter and adopted son/ daughter. It may be noticed that according to the Act of 1956 right of adoption has been given to a male and female both to adopt either a male or female child. The effect of such adoption is that by virtue of adoption a male or female child becomes a 'son' or 'daughter' as the case may be of the adopter and this constitute a separate category i.e. adopted son/daughter and that is why plurality is not attached with the words 'brother' and 'sister' under Rule 2 (c) (iv) as the kind of 'brother' and 'sister' for the purposes of this rule or other rules is not more than one."

¶23

In view of the law laid down by this Court in the case of Tarun Kumar (Supra) the order passed by the respondent no.3/District Basic Education Officer, Ballia, dated 19.3.2005 is liable to be set aside and the same is hereby set aside. A mandamus is issued to the respondent no.3/District Basic Education Officer, Ballia to pass a fresh order, strictly in accordance with law expeditiously and preferably within a period of four months from the date of production of a certified copy of this order before him.

¶24

Accordingly, the writ petition is allowed.

¶25

Order Date :- 18.10.2019

¶26

PKC

Meera Devi v. State of U.P. and Others

Case brief

What is this about?

What did the court decide?

Meera Devi v. State of U.P. and Others

Case brief

What is this about?

What did the court decide?

What the court decided

A compact analysis

Issues for consideration

Cases cited

Statutes considered

Parties & counsel

Coram

Case details

Similar cases

Smt. Pooja and Another Vs State of U.P. and 3 Others

Smt. Ummekulsum Rajahamed Shaikh and Another Vs State of U.P. and 3 Others

Smt. Pragya @ Afsana Bano and Another Vs State of U.P. and 3 Others

Iqbal Ahmad and Another Vs State of U.P. Thru Secy Education Basic and Others

Suresh Chandra and Another Vs Chairman Alld. Kshetriya Gramin Bank and Others

Raj Kumar Shukla Vs State of U.P. and Others