The court dismissed an application seeking to quash criminal proceedings for rape under Section 376 IPC. Relying on the Supreme Court's recent directive, the court held that such non-compoundable offenses cannot be quashed merely due to a compromise.
None. The application to quash the charge sheet, cognizance order, and trial proceedings was dismissed.
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Court No. - 70
Case :- APPLICATION U/S 482 No. - 10817 of 2019
Applicant :- Rashid Opposite Party :- State Of U.P. And Anr Counsel for Applicant :- Vinay Kumar Singh,Rajesh Kumar Singh Counsel for Opposite Party :- G.A.
Hon'ble Sanjay Kumar Singh,J.
Ms. Ruchita Jain, Advocate has filed Vakalatnama on behalf of the opposite party no.2, is taken on record.
Heard learned counsel for the applicant, learned counsel for the opposite party no.2 and learned Additional Government Advocate for the State/opposite party no.1 and perused the record with the assistance of leaned counsel for the parties.
This application under Section 482 Cr.P.C. has been filed by the applicant with a prayer to quash the charge-sheet no. 1 of 2018 dated 28.8.2018 arising out of Case Crime No. 167 of 2018 as well as cognizance order dated 11.10.2018 and proceedings of Session Trial No. 222 of 2018 (State Vs. Rashid), under Section 376 IPC, Police Station Nawabad, District -Jhansi pending in the court of Additional Sessions Judge/Fast Track Court (O.A.W.), Jhansi.
It is submitted by learned counsel for the parties that since the compromise has taken place between the parties concerned, therefore, the aforesaid impugned criminal proceedings is liable to be quashed by this Court.
Learned counsel for the opposite party no.2 also does not dispute the aforesaid facts and filed compromise affidavit on behalf of the opposite party no.2 mentioning that the applicant and opposite party no.2 (victim) have solved their dispute by compromise and it is no injury case, therefore, now there is no differences between them. It is further submitted that age of the applicant is 21 years while the age of the opposite party no.2 is 31 years. Since, the applicant wanted to keep the opposite party no.2 with him but on account of age difference, the applicant denied the terms put forth by the opposite party no.2.
Per contra, learned AGA submitted that the offence under Section 376 IPC is not a compoundable offence, therefore, the impugned criminal proceedings against the applicant cannot be quashed even after compromise made between the parties
concerned.
After having heard the arguments of learned counsel for the parties, this Court is of the view that it is well settled that offence under Section 376 IPC is not an individual but it is an offence against the society at large. The Apex Court recently on 4.3.2019 in the case of State of Madhya Pradesh Vs. Laxmi Narayan and others passed in Criminal Appeal No. 349 of 2019 has ruled that the criminal proceedings under Section 376 IPC cannot be quashed merely on the basis of compromise made between the victim and offender. The guideline laid down by the Apex Court in para 13 of the said judgment is reproduced herein-below:-
"13. Considering the law on the point and the other decisions of this Court on the point, referred to hereinabove, it is observed and held as under:
i) that the power conferred under Section 482 of the Code toquash the criminal proceedings for the non-compoundable offences under Section 320 of the Code can be exercised having overwhelmingly and predominantly the civil character, particularly those arising out of commercial transactions or arising out of matrimonial relationship or family disputes and when the parties have resolved the entire dispute amongst themselves;
ii) such power is not to be exercised in those prosecutions which involved heinous and serious offences of mental depravity or offences like murder, rape, dacoity, etc. Such offences are not private in nature and have a serious impact on society;
iii) similarly, such power is not to be exercised for the offences under the special statutes like Prevention of Corruption Act or the offences committed by public servants while working in that capacity are not to be quashed merely on the basis of compromise between the victim and the offender;
iv) offences under Section 307 IPC and the Arms Act etc. would fall in the category of heinous and serious offences and therefore are to be treated as crime against the society and not against the individual alone, and therefore, the criminal proceedings for the offence under Section 307 IPC and/or the
Arms Act etc., which have a serious impact on the society cannot be quashed in exercise of powers under Section 482 of the Code, on the ground that the parties have resolved their entire dispute amongst themselves. However, the High Court would not rest its decision merely because there is a mention of Section 307 IPC in the FIR or the charge is framed under this provision. It would be open to the High Court to examine as to whether incorporation of Section 307 IPC is there for the sake of it or the prosecution has collected sufficient evidence, which if proved, would lead to framing the charge under Section 307 IPC. For this purpose, it would be open to the High Court to go by the nature of injury sustained, whether such injury is inflicted on the vital/delegate parts of the body, nature of weapons used etc. However, such an exercise by the High Court would be permissible only after the evidence is collected after investigation and the charge sheet is filed/charge is framed and/or during the trial. Such exercise is not permissible when the matter is still under investigation. Therefore, the ultimate conclusion in paragraphs 29.6 and 29.7 of the decision of this Court in the case of Narinder Singh (supra) should be read harmoniously and to be read as a whole and in the circumstances stated hereinabove;
v) while exercising the power under Section 482 of the Code to quash the criminal proceedings in respect of noncompoundable offences, which are private in nature and do not have a serious impart on society, on the ground that there is a settlement/compromise between the victim and the offender, the High Court is required to consider the antecedents of the accused; the conduct of the accused, namely, whether the accused was absconding and why he was absconding, how he had managed with the complainant to enter into a compromise etc."
In of above, the law laid down by the Apex Court in case of State of M.P. Vs. Laxmi Narain and others (supra), I do not find any merit in the present application, as the relief claimed by the applicants cannot be granted in view of settled principle law laid down by the Apex Court as mentioned above.
The present application lacks merit and is, accordingly, dismissed .
Order Date :- 1.4.2019 AK Pandey
2 issues framed by the court
Whether criminal proceedings under Section 376 IPC can be quashed under Section 482 Cr.P.C. despite a compromise between the offender and the victim.
Whether the relief claimed in the application lacks merit based on settled legal principles.
Colour shows how this judgement treated each authority
State of Madhya Pradesh Vs. Laxmi Narayan and othersRelied on¶12
State of Madhya Pradesh Vs. Laxmi Narayan and others in Criminal Appeal No. 349 of 2019
2 provisions across 2 enactments
Rashid
State Of U.P.
Sanjay Kumar Singh
As recorded by the court registry
Judgements on the same questions, provisions and authorities, from every court
