counted and shall be reckoned with. This portion of award has not been notified either by High Court or by the Supreme Court, meaning thereby, for all purposes, the services of the petitioner came to be restored on 31st March, 1991 and, therefore, if the Department did not reinstate the petitioner on the ground that its writ petition was pending, it was a fault of the Department not to reinstate the petitioner and the petitioner cannot be penalized for the same. The argument, therefore, that the petitioner is fully entitled for regularization is absolutely correct and that is why the representation was made by the petitioner on 16th October, 2006. It appears that while petitioner made the representation for regularization on 16th October, 2006 and for regular pay-scale on 14th November, 2006 (Annexure-9 to the writ petition), the respondent passed another order on 11th December, 2006 which is impugned in the writ petition. Under this order, the petitioner’s services have been dispensed with on account of that his services are no more required. Thus, the order is camouflaged in a language of an order termination simpliciter taking him to have continued on 16 years as a Muster Role employee and accordingly, the retrenchment compensation was also provided to be paid to him under the order impugned. The challenge to the order on the ground that the petitioner who was reinstated in the year 1991 well before the cut of date i.e. 29th June, 1991, after reinstatement in service treated as to have continued for the period 1991 to 2006 during which regularization rules came to be enforced and, therefore, the petitioner is fully entitled for regularization under the Regularization Rules, 2001.
