The High Court dismissed the applicant's application to quash a summoning order. The court held that the matter involves disputed questions of fact and does not fall within categories justifying quashing, thus prohibiting a pre-trial adjudication on merits.
Prayer for quashing of summoning order was refused; interim order vacated.
This page shows the compact analysis of this judgement. The full analysis — procedural history, issue-by-issue holdings with ratio and obiter, advocates, and paragraph-level evidence for every claim — is being added to the record in batches and will appear here when this judgement has been through it.
Court No. - 48
Case :- APPLICATION U/S 482 No. - 12636 of 2006
Applicant :- Shiv Naresh & Another Opposite Party :- State Of U.P. & Another Counsel for Applicant :- Jitendra Prasad Mishra Counsel for Opposite Party :- Govt. Advocate
Hon'ble Karuna Nand Bajpayee,J.
This application under Section 482 Cr.P.C. has been filed seeking the quashing of impugned summoning order dated 3.11.2004 by A.C.J.M.- I, Banda in Complaint Case No. 3816/IX/03, Ram Prasad vs. Shiv Naresh and another, under Sections 498A, 323, 506 I.P.C., Police Station Pailani, District- Banda.
Heard learned counsel for the applicants and learned AGA. Perused the record.
All the contentions raised by the counsel for the applicants relate to disputed questions of fact. The court has also been called upon to adjudge the testimonial worth of prosecution evidence and evaluate the same on the basis of various intricacies of factual details which have been touched upon on behalf of applicants. The veracity and credibility of material furnished on behalf of the prosecution has been questioned and false implication has been pleaded. The submissions made by the learned counsel for the applicants call for adjudication on pure questions of fact which may be adequately adjudicated upon only by the trial court and while doing so even the submissions made on points of law can also be more appropriately gone into by the trial court in this case. This Court does not deem it proper, and therefore cannot be persuaded to have a pretrial before the actual trial begins.
The law regarding sufficiency of material which may justify the summoning of accused and also the court's decision to proceed against him in a given case is well settled. The court has to eschew itself from embarking upon a roving enquiry into the last details of the case. It is also not advisable to adjudge whether the case shall ultimately end in conviction or not. Only a prima facie satisfaction of the court about the existence of sufficient ground to proceed in the matter is required.
Through a catena of decisions given by Hon'ble Apex Court this legal aspect has been expatiated upon at length and the law that has evolved over a period of several decades is too well settled. In the case of Chandra Deo Singh Vs. Prokash Chandra Bose AIR 1963 SC 1430 the Apex Court had observed as follows:
" The courts have also pointed out in these cases that what the magistrate has to see is whether there is evidence in support of the allegations of the complainant and not whether the evidence is sufficient to warrant a conviction. The learned Judges is some of these cases have been at pains to observe that an enquiry under Section 202 is not to be likened to a trial which can only take place after process is issued, and that there can be only one trial. No doubt, as stated in sub-section (1) of Section 202 itself, the object of the enquiry is to ascertain the truth or falsehood of the
complaint, but the magistrate making the enquiry has to do this only with reference to the intrinsic quality of the statements made before him at the enquiry which would naturally mean the complaint itself, the statement on oath made by the complainant and the statements made before him by persons examined at the instance of the complainant."
In the yet another case of Vadilal Panchal Vs. Dattatraya Dulaji Ghadigaonker AIR 1960 SC 1113 the Hon'ble Supreme Court had expressed the views in the following terms:
" Section 202 says that the magistrate may, if he things fit, for reasons to be recorded in writing, postpone the issue of process for compelling the attendance of the person complained against and direct an inquiry for the purpose of ascertaining the truth or falsehood of the complaint; in other words, the scope of an inquiry under the section is limited to find out the truth or falsehood of the complaint in order to determine the question of the issue of process. The inquiry is for the purpose of ascertaining the truth or falsehood of the complaint; that is, for ascertaining whether there is evidence in support of the complaint so as to justify the issue of process and commencement of proceedings against the person concerned. The section does not say that a regular trial for adjudging the guilt or otherwise of the person complained against should take place at the stage; for the person complained against can be legally called upon to answer the accusation made against him only when a process has issued and he is put on trial."
In the case of Smt. Nagawwa Vs. Veeranna Shivalingappa Konjalgi 1976 3 SCC 736 the Hon'ble Apex Court had held as follows:
"The magistrate has been given an undoubted discretion in the matter and the discretion has to be judicially exercised by him. Once the magistrate has exercised his discretion it is not for the High Court, or even this Court, to substitute its own discretion for that of the magistrate or to examine the case on merits with a view to find out whether or not the allegations in the complaint, if proved, would ultimately end in conviction of the accused. These considerations, in our opinion, are totally foreign to the scope and ambit of an inquiry under Section 202 of the Code of Criminal Procedure which culminates into an order under Section 204 of the Code. Thus it may be safely held that in the following cases an order of the magistrate issuing process against the accused can be quashed or set aside:
(1) where the allegations made in the complaint or the statements of the witnesses recorded in support of the same taken at their face value make out absolutely no case against the accused or the complaint does not disclose the essential ingredients of an offence which is alleged against the accused;
(2) where the allegations made in the complaint are patently absurd and inherently improbable so that no prudent person can ever reach a conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused;
(3) Where the discretion exercised by the magistrate in issuing process is capricious and arbitrary having been based either on no evidence or on materials which are wholly irrelevant or inadmissible; and
(4) where the complaint suffers from fundamental legal defects, such as, want of sanction, or absence of a complaint by legally competent authority and the like.
The cases mentioned by us are purely illustrative and provide sufficient guidelines to indicate contingencies where the High Court can quash proceedings."
The Apex Court decisions given in the case of R.P. Kapur Vs. State of Punjab AIR 1960 SC 866 and in the case of State of Haryana Vs. Bhajan Lal 1992 SCC(Cr.) 426 have also recognized certain categories by way of illustration which may justify the quashing of a complaint or charge sheet. Some of them are akin to the illustrative examples given in the above referred case of Smt. Nagawwa Vs. Veeranna Shivalingappa Konjalgi 1976 3 SCC 736. It was observed by the Hon'ble Apex Court in Bhajan Lal's case as follows:-
" The following categories can be stated by way of illustration wherein the extra-ordinary power under Article 226 or the inherent powers under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure can be exercised by the High Court either to prevent abuse of the process of any Court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice, though it may not be possible to lay down any precise, clearly defined and sufficiently channelised and inflexible guidelines or rigid formulae and to give an exhaustive list of myriad kinds of cases wherein such power should be exercised:
(1) where the allegations made in the First Information Report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused.
(2) where the allegations in the First Information Report and other materials, if any, accompanying the F.I.R. do not disclose a cognizable offence, justifying an investigation by police officers under Section 156(1) of the Code except under an order of a Magistrate within the purview of Section 155(2) of the Code.
(3) where the uncontroverted allegations made in the FIR or complaint and the evidence collected in support of the same do not disclose the commission of any offence and make out a case against the accused.
(4) where the allegations in the FIR do not constitute a cognizable offence but constitute only a non-cognizable offence, no investigation is permitted by a police officer without an order of a Magistrate as contemplated under Section 155(2) of the Code.
(5) where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint are so absurd and inherently improbable on the basis of which no prudent person can ever reach a just conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused.
(6) where there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of the provisions of the Code or the concerned Act (under which a criminal proceeding is instituted) to the institution and continuance of the proceedings and/or where there is a specific provision in the Code or the concerned Act, providing efficacious redress for the grievance of the aggrieved party.
(7) where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with mala fide and/or where the proceeding is maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the accused and with a view to spite him due to private and personal grudge."
Illumined by the case law referred to herein above, this Court has adverted to the entire record of the case.
A threadbare discussion of various facts and circumstances, as they emerge from the allegations made against the accused, is being purposely avoided by the Court for the reason, lest the same might cause any prejudice to either side during trial. But it shall suffice to observe that the perusal of the complaint, and also the material available on record make out a prima facie case against the accused at this stage and I do not find any justification to quash the complaint or the summoning order or the proceedings against the applicants arising out of them as the case does not fall in any of the categories recognized by the Apex Court which may justify their quashing.
The prayer for quashing the same is refused as I do not see any abuse of the Court's process either.
The interim order, if any, is vacated.
However, it is observed that if the bail has not been obtained as yet, the accused may appear before the court below and apply for bail within two months from today. The court below shall make an endeavour to decide the bail application keeping in view the observations made by the Court in the Full Bench decision of Amrawati and another Vs. State of U.P. 2004 (57) ALR 290 and also in view of the decision given by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Lal Kamlendra Pratap Singh Vs. State of U.P. 2009 (3) ADJ 322 (SC).
In the aforesaid period or till the date of appearance of the accused in the court below, whichever is earlier, no coercive measures shall be taken or given effect to.
With the aforesaid observations this application is finally disposed off. Order Date :- 2.8.2018 Naresh
1 issue framed by the court
Whether the summoning order under Sections 498A, 323, 506 IPC should be quashed by the High Court under Section 482 Cr.P.C.
Colour shows how this judgement treated each authority
Chandra Deo Singh Vs. Prokash Chandra BoseReferred¶9
Chandra Deo Singh Vs. Prokash Chandra Bose AIR 1963 SC 1430 · Who else cites this
Vadilal Panchal Vs. Dattatraya Dulaji GhadigaonkerReferred¶12
Vadilal Panchal Vs. Dattatraya Dulaji Ghadigaonker AIR 1960 SC 1113 · Who else cites this
Smt. Nagawwa Vs. Veeranna Shivalingappa KonjalgiReferred¶14
Smt. Nagawwa Vs. Veeranna Shivalingappa Konjalgi 1976 3 SCC 736 · Who else cites this
R.P. Kapur Vs. State of PunjabReferred¶21
R.P. Kapur Vs. State of Punjab AIR 1960 SC 866 · Who else cites this
State of Haryana Vs. Bhajan LalReferred¶21
State of Haryana Vs. Bhajan Lal 1992 SCC(Cr.) 426 · Who else cites this
Amrawati and another Vs. State of U.P.Referred¶34
Amrawati and another Vs. State of U.P. 2004 (57) ALR 290
Lal Kamlendra Pratap Singh Vs. State of U.P.Referred¶34
Lal Kamlendra Pratap Singh Vs. State of U.P. 2009 (3) ADJ 322 (SC.)
1 provisions across 1 enactments
Shiv Naresh
State Of U.P.
Karuna Nand Bajpayee
As recorded by the court registry
Judgements on the same questions, provisions and authorities, from every court
