(12) A reading of provisions of Section 138 of the Act, together with its proviso, shows that the proviso prescribes the manner in which a prosecution under Section 138 of the Act is to be launched, prescribing a calendar for it. The conditions enumerated in Clauses (a) and (b) of the proviso, are not relevant to the issue, that arises in the present case. But Clause (c) to the proviso clearly stipulates, that the last event in the calendar is dealt with there, which says, that an offence under the Section would be made out, if the drawer of a cheque fails to make payment of the due amount of money to the payee, or as the case may, to the holder in due course of the cheque, within 15 days of receipt of the said notice. Logically, a complaint will not be maintainable, if it is instituted on the 10th day, the 11th day or even the 14th day of receipt of notice of demand by the payee from the drawer, envisaged under Clause (b) to the Proviso. The complaint in that case would be premature and, therefore, not maintainable. The Magistrate cannot take cognizance of a complaint, or issue process to the drawer, for an offence punishable under Section 138 of the Act. Subsequent passage of time will not count towards the scheduled number of days, envisaged under clause (c) of Proviso to Section 138 of the Act, for a valid cause of action can accrue only on the expiry of 15 days from the date of receipt of notice of demand, and not earlier. The cause of action must have accrued to the drawer on the day when the complaint is filed; it makes no difference that the period of 15 days passes by, after the complaint is filed. The provisions of Section 138, including Clause (c) to the Proviso, being penal, have to be strictly construed. In short, there can be no valid complaint,
